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I. INTRODUCTIO~ 
Having decided to bring into the dutiable estate 'any 
property comprised in any dutiable gift made by the deceased 
uithin three years before his death•, 1 it was necessary for 
the legislature to prevent an anomaly arising in situations 
uhere the deceased had made an inter vivas gift outside 
this three year period, but reserved benefits out of those 
dispositions which he enjoyed within the three year period 
before his death. Sections 11 and 12 of the Estate and 
Gift Duties Act 1968 (hereafter called the Act) were designed 
to prevent a person escaping estate duty in this way. In 
such situation s these sections operate to bring into th 
dutiable estate the entire corpus of the gift, no matter 
when the gift was made. 
However, it is possible for the donor to withhold an 
interest from a gift in such a way that sections 11 a nd 12 
do not apply. These sections operate only on the corpus of 
what was given and the courts have drawn the distinction 
between a gift to uhich the donor is absolutely disentitled, 
retaining to himself a specific interest, and the reservation 
out of the gifted property itself. If the donor gives away 
par ticular interests or estates in property and retains 
1Estate and Gift Duties Act 1968 section 10. 
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other interests in the same property for hi~self, the 
interests so retained never pass to the donee and do not 
form part of the corpus of the gift. 2 The interest 
retained is not part of the subject-matter of the gift and 
the donor can enjoy that interest consistently with his 
entire exclusion from the subject-matter of the gift. 
The difficulty arises in trying to decide whether the 
interest which the donor has is a retained or a reserved 
interest. 3 It has been suggested that there are three 
separate elements which have to be considered in determining 
this question: first, did the donor have the ability to 
give away the particular interest which, it is alleged, is 
reserved to him?; secondly, if he had the ability, did he 
give that interest away with the rest of the corpus at the 
time the gift was made?; thirdly, if he intended to retain 
the interest was that interest capable of being severed and 
retained from the remainder of the corpus of the gift? Or 
was it necessarily a reservation out of that which was given? 
In the main it has been the first and second of those 
questions that the courts have been concerned with in this 
area. A line of authority concerning the transfer of land 
has illustrated how the courts have dealt with the issues 
involved. 4 The leading case here is Munro v C.S.D. The facts 
2 
S e e e • g • lJ h eel er v H urn p h r e y s [1 8 9 aj A • C • 5 0 6 • 
3Adams and Richardson, Law of Estate and Gift Duties (4th ed. 1970) p.92. 
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of that case are as follows: in 1909 the donor entered into 
a verbal partnership with his children in respect of his 
farm; in 1913 he gifted part of the property to trustees on 
trust for his children. The partnership continued to use 
the land until the donor's death although there was no formal 
partnership agreement until 1919. 
The Judicial Committee considered it relevant that 'the 
transfers made in 1913 were intended to be subject to the 
partnership right•, 5 and held, under statutory language 
similar to that in section 11, 6 that the gift was not dutiable. 
In a similar fact situation the majority of the High 
7 Court of Australia in C.S.D. v Owens distinguished Munro's 
case on the grounds that there the 8 
••• agreement with respect to land had created an 
interest in the land; so that the gift of the land, 
if it was a gift subject to the right of partnership, 
was necessarily a gift, not of a fee-simple but of a 
fee-simple 'shorn' (to quote their Lordships' expression) 
'of tha right which belonged to the p3rtnership' . 
In this case the donor and his son had agreed verbally 
to work the donor's two properties in common and share profits 
and losses. Five years later the donor gave one of the 
properties to the son by registered transfer , without any 
C 
J ibid 67 . 
6 section 102(2)(d) Stamp Duties Act 1920-31 (New South Wales). 
7
(1952) 88 C.L . R. 67. 
8 ibid 84. 
4. 
indication of any rights reserved to the donor. The donor, 
however, told his son he was not required to continue 
under the earlier arrangement but the son chose to do so. 
Dixon C.J. and Kitto J., in a joint judgment, went on 
9 to say: 
And even if the fact had been that a tendency or other 
interest in the land had been created before the gift, 
the case would still have differed fundamentally from 
Munro's case, because the deceased and his donas, being 
the only persons concerned, would have been competent 
to determine by their own agreement whether the gift 
should comprise the fee-simple subject to the outstanding 
right or the fee-simple freed from that right 1 and the 
declarntions make it very clear th3t the fee-simple, 
undiminished by anything at all, was what they joined 
in making the subject of their transaction. 
Taylor J., on the other hand, in his dissenting judgment, 
1 0 thought 
••• that it was the father's intention to give the 
property subject to the rights of both parties under 
the existing arrangement for no other intention could 
in the circumstances of this case be consistent. 
In Re Nichol, Johnstone v C.S.D. (No. 2) 11 the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal looked at another transaction 
involving land. 
9 ibid 86-87. 
10ibid 98. 
In that case the donor owned a half share 
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of the land a nd tuo of his sons owned the other half equally. 
All three were in a farming partnership using the land. The 
donor gifted part of his land by transferring it to the two 
sons (and one other son). After the gift the partnership 
continued as before. Four years l ater there was a new 
arrangement by which each partner got a one-third share in 
the partnership. 
Smith J. 12 who delivered the leading judgment in the 
Court of Appeal considered that the parties , by their 
actions, showed that the donor intended to give the whole 
esta te and land free from any tenancy or rights in the 
partnership. Adams J. 13 reached a similar conclusion . It 
was held that all the land comprised in the gift c ame into 
the donor's dutiable estate under th e equivalent of section 11. 
Th ese cases do show that it is possible for a donor to 
tie up the benefits back to hims~lf before the gift and make 
the gift expressly subject to the earlier interests, thereby 
avoid ing the effects of section 11. 14 It is significant 
ho1J~ ver that all these cases involved ituations where the 
interests retained or reserved by the donor we re interests 
1 2 ibid 750 . 
13 ibid 733. Reed and Ostler J.J . concurred in th e judgments delivered . 
111 See e . g . Y.F.R. Grbich, ' Dispositions with Strings' i n (ss2,s on the Estate and Gift 0Jties Act 1968 I.L.M. 
Richardso n ed . 4th ed. 1970 p.88. 
W. D. Goodman, 'C ases in Estate Planning Which Went Sour' Estates and Trusts Quarterly vol. 1 p . 15 . 
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which existed in a legal sense before the gifting took 
place - they were interests which any of the parties con-
cerned could have acted upon to have various rights or 
obligations performed vis-a-vis any of the other parties. 
In each case the question whether the gift was made subject 
to the partnership rights of the donor or whether it was 
made freed from those rights was determined by the Court by 
considering such factors as the form of the transaction and 
the intention of the donor. The important point is however 
that it was possible for the donor to sever and retain the 
partnership rights in the land from the corpus of the gift 
if he chose to do so. 
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II. DEFINING THE ISSUE 
Many of th8 cases which the Courts have had to consider 
in this area have concerned the settlement of trusts where 
the settlor has purported to retain certain of the beneficial 
interests in the settled property. It is the implications 
of this type of case for the application of the notional 
estate provisions which form the basis of this paper. The 
provisions in those sections with which we shall be primarily 
concerned are the first limb of section 11(1) and 
section 12(1)(a). 
Consider, for example, the following situations: 
(1) A transfers property to trust es to hold on trust 
for B for life, uith the reversion to A himself. 
(2) A transfers property to trustees to hold on trust 
with an annuity of $X from the trust in,ome to B 
for life and any excess income from the trust 
property to A, and then on A's death to B absolutely. 
The question which arises in each of these cases is: 
Ar8 the rights retained by A not included in the subject-
natter of the gift, or a reservation from that subject-matter? 
It is the object of this paper to show that in such cases 
the donor has necessarily re:,erved his int1:1rest out of the 
subject-matter of the gift and that therefore the relevant 
provisions in sections 11 and 12 operate to bring the whole 
gift back into the dutiabl8 estate. 
• 
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The basis for this conclusion is that the interest 
uhich A has is incapable of being severed and retained from 
the remainder of the corpus of the gift and, bacause of the 
nature of the interest, it is necessarily a reservation out 
of that which was given - that is, such cases fall under 
1 5 the third element which, it has been suggested, has to be 
considered in determining whether the donor has a retained 
or a reserved interest in the property given. 
The paper will be considering various areas in support 
of this proposition. Initially it will examine the relevant 
provisions in the Act and determine how these relate to the 
concept of a transfer of property to trustees on trust. 
Obviously this is i~portant since the conclusion reached on 
the issue must be consistent with the provisions in the 
governing statute . 
Probably the most important issue to be answered is the 
question of the subject-matter comprised in a disposition. 
Both section 11 and section 12 operate to bring into the 
dutiable estate ' any property comprised in' any dispo3ition ••• 
Ther e are two conflicting lines of authority on this 
question where it concerns transfers of property to trustees 
on trust in cases where the donor has purported to retain 
Rn interest in that property to himself. The first is what 
is referred to in this paper 1 6 as the Hall's case approach. 
16c.s.o. v Perpetual Trustee Co. Ltd. f.194~] A.C. 425. 
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The cases following this approach established that a donor 
only disposes of those interests which are taken by the 
donees of the disposition - that is, the beneficiaries of 
17 the trust - and does not dispose of an interest which he 
retains for himself . Clearly if this approach is accepted 
the proposition put forward in this paper is incorrect . 
The second, and preferred, approach is what is referred 
1 8 to as the Sneddon's casa approach . This line of authority 
established that the property comprised in the disposition is 
the actual property uhich the donor transferred to the 
trustees. This approach is consistent with the proposition 
put forward in this paper. 
The paper will also consider some 'speci l' cases uhich 
have presented analytical difficulties for the Courts. Their 
relationship to the Sneddon principle will be examined but 
it is suggested that these cases are in no real sense a 
departure from that principle. 
Further support for the above proposition is found in 
an exanination of the trust conce~t itself and the differing 
interests uhich arise under it. It is suggested that the 
very nature of the trust precludes the application of the 
Hall's case approach and supports the Sneddon ' s case approach . 
1 7 Post. p ..l.O 
18 sneddon v Lord Advocab=? (~95~ A.C . 257. 
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Recent decisions in the English, Canadian and Australian 
jurisdictions indicate that the trend of the Courts is towards 
an acceptance of the approach taken in Sneddon's case and 
away from the approach taken in Hall's case. These cases 
and their implications will be examined. 
Finally, the paper will consider some of the problems 
which occur when the approach taken in Sneddon's case is 
applied. It uill also be suggested that perhaps the operation 
of equitable doctrines should have no bearing on the 
application of statutes concerned with areas of the law not 
concerned with the machinery of the trust or its workings -
for example, taxing statutes. 
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III. THE DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY AND THE CREATION OF A TRUST 
One of the principle elements of a 'gift' within the 
meaning of the Act is the concept of the 'disposition of 
property'. An exhaustive definition of these words is sot 
out in section 2(2). For the purposes of this paper we are 
primarily concerned with para (b): 
' Disposition of property ' means any conveyance , 
transfer, assignment, settlement, delivery, payment, 
or other alienation of property, whether at law or in 
equity; and, without limiting the generality of the 
foregoing provisions of this definition, includes -
. . . 
. ( b) The creation of a trust 
. . . 
The particular reason for 'placing the creation of a 
trust ' in a special category is unclear. It is suggested 
that the express inclusions in the definition of 'disposition 
of property' cover those situatiuns which might be difficult 
to fit under the general words in the definition. It appears 
to have been accepted that the emphasis of these general 
words is on the alienation of property and all imply a change 
of ownership of the property in question . 19 
There are two basic methods of creating a trust. The first 
is by the transfer of the trust property from the settlor to 
the trustees and there is no difficulty in bringing this 
19 c.s.o . v Card Q940] N.Z.L.R . 637,649 (C.A.) Adams and Richardson suora n . 3 p . 29 . 
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situation under the general words of the definition. The 
second method is by the declaration of trust - that is, a 
unilateral act of the owner of the property whereby he states 
that he thenceforth holds certain of his property on trust 
for others. Here there is conflicting opinion as to whether 
20 any transfer of property can be said to have taken place. 
It might be arguable therefore that a declaration of trust 
does not fall under the general words in the definition and 
needs to be placed in a Special category in the definition. 
If this were so the expressio unius exclusio alterius maxim 21 
would probably prevent the legislature merely placing 'the 
decliration of a trust' in a special category. Hence this 
could be the reason that 'the creation of a trust' is so 
Alternatively, the reason might be, as one commentator 22 
has suggested, that because of the special nature of the trust, 
dispositions by way of 'the creation of a trust' are intended 
to be treated in a different way to absolute dispositions. 
The application of the definition of 'disposition of 
property' to 'the creation of a trust' raises a number of 
1 . · · 23 h. h h t b .d d pre 1m1nary issues w 1c ave o e consi ere; When is a 
trust created?; How many dispositions are involved? To 
whom is a trust disposition made? 
21 See generally Maxwell on the Interpretation of St8tutes (12th ed. 1969) 293-297. 
22 Adams and Richardson, supr3 n.3 p.33. 
23 See generall½ Adams and Richardson su?ra n.3 pp. 32-34. 
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Llhen is a Trust Created? 
A trust is 'created' for the purposes of para (b) when 
specific property is impressed with the terms of a trust. 
In Baldwin v C.I.R. 24 Macarthur J. considered the words 'a 
25 trust has been created'. H .d 26 e sai: 
In my opinion the phrase •a trust has been created' 
in section 84A simply means •a trust has been brought 
into legal existence•. No particular method of 
creation of a trust is indicated by the section. I 
think therefore that if it is shown that trust 
obligations have been imposed or constituted in 
respect of certain property by one or nore of the 
.specified persons then a trust has been created by 
that person or those persons within the meaning of 
the section. 
The trust only comes into existence when the original 
trust property becomes vested in the trustees - that is, 
when the trustees have the legal interest in the property. 
A gratuitous promise by the settlor to convey property will 
not constitute the trust because the promise is unenforceable. 
This is supported by the much quoted passage from the 
. d t f T J . r11 ·1 V Lord·. 27 JU gmen o urner • in _1_i_r_o_y ___ _ 
Q965] N.Z.L.R. 1. 
255 t· ec ion 84A Land and Income Tax Act 1954 (now repealed). 
26 B96Sj N.Z.L.R. 1, 6. 
See also Tucker v C.I.R. ~.Z.L.R. 1027, 1030. 
27 (1862) 4 De G.F. & J. 264 at 274. 
14. 
I take the law of this Court to be well settled, that, 
in order to render a voluntary settlement valid and 
effectual, the settlor must have done everything which, 
according to the nature of the property comprised in 
the settlement, was necessary to be done in ordar to 
transfer the property and render the settlement binding 
upon him. He may of course do this by actually trans-
ferring the property to the persons for whom he intends 
to provide, and the provision will then be effectual, 
and it will be equally effectual if he transfers the 
property to a trustee for the purposes of the settlement, 
or declares that he himself holds it in trust for those 
purposes ••• but, in order to rander the settlement 
binding, one or other of these modes must, as I under-
stand the law of the Court, be resorted to, for there 
is no equity in this Court to perfect an imperfect gift . 
It is clear from this statement that a settlement is 
'complete and perfect' and 'a trust has been created' when 
the assignor has performed some act which passes the beneficial 
(though not necessarily the legal) interest in the property 
to another. 28 
The terms of a trust may be established in a deed executed 
by the settlor and th e trustees of the proposed trust. Often 
the deed provides that the trust fund is to consist of a certain 
sum which is to be vested in the trustees at a later date. In 
these circumstances it is suggested that the trust is ere ted 
28 Howe ver when the donor has done everything which it is necessary for him to do to render the transfer effectual , but something remains to bg done by a third party, the transfer, though invalid at law, is nevertheless valid in equity: 
S e e e • g • B e R a s e , R a s e v I • R • C • Q 9 5 2j 1 A 11 E • R • 1 2 1 7 • 
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when the sum in question is actually transferred to the 
trustees and not upon the execution of the deed. In 
Sneddon v Lord Advocate Lord Keith in his dissenting judgment 
was of the opinion that such a deed effected the disposition 
of property at the time it was executed and that the later 
payment to the trustees merely satisfied the trust which 
29 had already been declared. 
Lord Keith's conclusion is consistent with his view 
that the property taken under the disposition was 'the corpus 
of the trust estate whatever that might be from time to time' 
30 and it was this which was to be valued for death duty purposes. 
However, it is well established that this view of the property 
comprised in a disposition is incorrect. 31 To apply Lord 
Keith's conclusion as to what constitutes the creation of a 
trust could have absurd results for the application of the 
notional estate provisions no matter whether the Hall's case 
approach or the Sneddon's case approach to the subject-matter 
~uestion was accepted. To hold that the execution of a 
trust deed constituted the creation of the trust would mean 
that later payments to the trustees to hold under the same 
trust dead would not be regarded as separate dispo~itions. 
There is support for this conclusion in Truesd le v F.C.T. 32 
where Menzies J. did not consider the words 'created a trust• 33 
29 
[1954] A.C. 257, 282. 
30
.ibid 283. 
31 Post. p1 i,O - ~Li 
32 1 A.T.R. 667. 
33 
Section 102 Income Tax Assessment Act 1936-1966. 
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apt to describe the payment of money to a trustee to hold 
under a trust already con~tituted: 34 
To read thn section as if it appliod to such a transfer 
would be, in the absence of a context , to expand it . 
Such a reading would be tantamount to saying that the 
transfer to the trustee of property to be held as part 
o f the assets of an already constituted trust would be 
to create a second trust, whereas , from the point of 
v iew of both the trustee and the beneficiary, there 
wou l d be but one trust and the property transferred 
would be nothing more than an addition to the property 
sub j ect to the trust. 
To apply this interpretation to the words in para (b) 
however would be contrary to the legislature's intention. 
It wo~ld enable the donor to execute a trust deed, for example, 
and under the terms of the trust reserve (assuming for the 
sake of argument that the interest is reserved out of what 
was given) to himself the income from the trust property 
for life. The donor could then transfer vast sums to the 
trustees on the trusts already constituted and enjoy large 
benefits during his life knowing that on his death section 11 
and section 12(1)(a) could only operate to bring into the 
dutiable estate that property which was actually tr3nsferred 
to the trustees on trust at the time of the execution of the 
trust deed . 
Clearly this would be an absurd result and would allow 
estate planners to escape what the legislature plainly intended 
34 
1 A. T . R. 667 , 670. 
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should be caught by the notional estate provisions. It 
would, in these circumstances, be unreasonable to apply 
the Truesdale approach. As Lord Reid said in Gill v 
Donald Humbershaw & Co. Ltd: 35 
If the language is capable of more than on interpre-
tation we ought to discard the more natural meaning 
if it leads to an unreasonable result and adopt that 
interpretation which leads to a reasonable and prac-
ticable result. 
Similarly in Shannon Realities Ltd. v Ville de Michel, 36 
Lord Shaw said: 37 
Llhere alternative constructions are equally open that 
alternative is to be chosen which will be consistent 
with the smooth working of the system which the statute 
purports to be regulating; and that alternative is to 
be rejected which will introduce uncertainty, friction 
or confusion into the working of the system . 
Certainly the conclusion of Menzies J. in Truesdale's 
case is contrary to that reached by Macarthur J. in Baldwin's 
case. 38 Macarthur J. held that where the terms of the trust 
are set out in a trust deed executed by the settlor and the 
trustees, a trust is 'created' only in respect of that property 
which is actually impressed with a trust at the time the deed 
is executed. Later transfers of property to the trustees 
35 [1963] 3 All E.R. 180, 183. 
See generally Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statut8s ( 12th ed . 1969) 4 5 , 203-5 . 
36 
[~92~J A.C. 185. 
37 ihll1. 192-93. 
38 
Q96~ N.Z .L.R. 1, 6-7. 
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to be held on the terms of the deed create further trusts 
in respect of that property. Each separate transfer is the 
creation of a separate trust, and is consequently a separate 
disposition of property under para (b). 
How Many Disoositions are Involved? 
39 One commentator has suggested that since , by virtue 
of para (b), the creation of a trust is itself to be regarded 
as a disposition then any transfers, payments or conveyances 
made in performance of the trust are not separate dispositions, 
for they are incidental to the creation of the trust or flow 
from it. With respect I think this is correct. 
However the question still arises as to how m ny dis-
po si tions are involved when the creation of a trust creates 
a number of beneficial interest in different beneficiaries . 
Do the different equitable interests vested in different 
beneficiaries each constitute a separate disposition or is 
there only the one disposition - namely, the transfer of 
the property to the trustees. 
This problem was considered by the High Court of Australia 
40 in MacCormick v F.C.T.. That case concerned a marriage 
settlement in which the settler had settled a fund on certain 
specified trusts. One of the questions to be decided was 
39 Adams and Richardson, suora n.3 p.33. 
40
(1945) 71 C.L.R. 283. 
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whether one of the equitable interests created fell within 
the exemption which the provision under consideration allowed 
for gifts made for or towards the maintenance, education or 
41 apprenticeship of any person. The question was whether 
a settlement creating interests in a number o~ donees was 
one gift or a number of separate gifts of each interest 
crP.ated by the settlement. 
Both Latham C.J. and Dixon J. rejected the argument 
that there were as many gifts as there were limitations to 
42 the donees. Starke J. disagreed with the majority on 
th . . t 43 1s po1n : 
Disposition of property by way of gift may therefore 
be created by trusts giving rise, as in this case, to 
various beneficial interests. And I see no reason why 
those various interests may not, in them elves, be 
gifts within the meaning of the Act ••• 
Unfortunately there are no New Zealand decisions on this 
question. However in the MacCormick case Latham C.J. and 
Dixon J. in reaching the conclusion that the creation of a 
single trust involved only one gift, relied on certain 
provisions in the Act under consideration which contemplated 
th a t different interests might be taken by a number of donees 
as a consequence of a single gift. There are corresponding 
provisions in the New Zealand Act. 44 While these alone do not 
41 Section 14 (i)(ii) Gift Duty Assessment Act 1941-42 (Commonwealth 
42 (1945) 71 C.L.R. 283, at 297 per Latham C.J. : at 304 per Dixon J. McTiernan J. concurred with Oixcn J. 
43.i!ud 303: See also per Rich J. ibid 301. 
44 Tho definition of 'donee• in section 2(2) : section 86(2) section 85(1 ). 
20. 
necessarily mean that the creation of a single trust must 
constitute a single gift, irrespective of the number of 
separate interests involved, the wording of para (b) itself, 
which refers to 'the creation of a trust' and not to 'the 
creation of a beneficial interest in a trust fund', does 
provide strong support for this conclusion. 
To Llhom is the Disposition Made? 
The relationship between the definition of 'donee' in 
section 2(2) and the concept of a disposition of property 
raises an interesting problem in the trust situation. Where 
the disposition is a direct transfer or conveyance of property 
45 or interests in property there is usually no problem: the 
donee is the person to whom the di position is made. It is 
suggested however that where the disposition is by way of 
trust the effect is different and the disposition is not made 
to the donee. Here, it is suggested, the disposition is made 
to the trustees of the trust whereas the don 9e or donees of 
the disposition are the beneficiaries under the tru3t. 
Our arguments so far support this conclurion: First, 
section 2(2) para (b) deems 'the creation of a trust' to be 
a disposition of property within the terms of the Act; 
Secondly , 'the creation of a trust' arises when the trust 
property is vested in the trustees; Thirdly, there is only 
45 Note however that in some cases the Court h3s taken ;,Ubstance approach in determining the question : To is the disposition made! 
See Past. p. s0 d 
a 
whom 
2·1. 
one disposition involved in 'the creation of a trust• and 
that is the transfer of the property from the donor to the 
trustees. Logically the only conclusion to be drawn frorn 
these propositions is that a payment or transfer of prope ty 
to trustees is a disposition to the trustees. 
This was certainly the view taken in Sneddon v Lord 
A d ' 4 6 L d f11 t f 1 . d 4 ? voca~e. or ,or on or examp e sai : 
... I feel no doubt that the property taken und2r 
the disposition was the sum of £5000. That was the 
only property which passed from the truster, and it 
was the only property taken by the trustees from the 
truster under his disposition. They took that 
property, of course, as trustees for the beneficiaries 
under the deed of trust. 
It does not necessarily follow from this though that the 
trustees are also the donees of the gift and quite clearly 
this is not the case, as th9 quote from Lord Morton in 
Sneddon's case (cited above) indicates. The donees of a 
disposition by way of trust are the beneficiaries under the 
'Dones' is defined in section 2(2) as meaning 'any 
person becoming entitled to any beneficial interest under a 
gift' (emphasis added). It is submitted that this wording 
indicates that there may be situations, such as occurs in a 
disposition by way of trust, uhere the beneficial interest 
unuer a disposition may not be vested in the person to whom 
the disposition was made. This conclusion is supported by 
another provision in the Act which says: 48 
46 Q954J A.C. 257. 
47 ibid 263-264 (emphasis add9d) 
48 section 86(3). 
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Where a gift has been made by way of trust for any 
donee, the gift duty shall, without excluding the 
liability of the donor or the donee, also constitute 
a debt due and payable to the Crown by the trustee 
in his capacity as trustee. 
Lord Keith in his dissenting judgment in Sn .ddon' s cD.se, 
having decided that the execution of the trust deed was the 
disposition, came to the conclusion that 'the donees here were 
49 the beneficiaries under the trust deed'. Similarly Lord 
Russell in delivering the judgrnent of the Court in Hall's 
f th . . th t 50 case was o e opinion a : 
The donee was the recipient of the gift; whether the 
son ~he beneficiary of the trust] alone (as their 
Lordships think) or whether the son and the body of 
trustees together constituted the donee, seems 
immaterial. The trustees alone were not the donee. 
It seems clear therefore that a p~yment or transfer of 
property can be a disposition to one person but a gift to 
another person. If this is the situation it uould help reconcile 
the difficulty Lord Keith had in Sneddon's case where he 
refused to flnd that the dispositions were the sepnrnte payments 
to the trustees. He illustrated the difficulty he had in 
the following way: 51 
49 
1)95~ ".c. 257, 202 . 
SO [)94~ A.C. 425, 439-440. 
See also Young and Davies Ltd. v C.S.D. ~95~ G.L.R. 524, 528. 51 D 9 5~ A. C. 2 5 7, 2 8 2. 
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The more passing of th .. chequo, as I see it, did 
not operate as a gift_ If it did the tru3tees could 
have put the proceeds in their pockets. The passing 
of the cheque was purely executorial, a piece of 
machinery to satisfy a trust which had already been 
declared. 
If however it were to be accepted that in such a case 
the passing of the cheque could at the same time be a 
disposition to the trustees and a gift to the beneficiaries 
of the trust then clearly no difficulty arises since the 
trustees take the payments under the terms of the trusts 
and hold them for the beneficiaries as the donees of the 
gift. 
Summary 
The conclusions so far can be summarised in terms of 
four interconnecting propositions: 
(1) The creation of a trust is itself a disposition of 
property within the terms of the Act. 
(2) The creation of the trust occurs when the trust 
property is vested in the trustees. 
(3) There is only one disposition involved in the 
creation of a trust and that is the transfer of 
the property from the donor to the trustees. 
(4) The creation of the trust results in a disposition 
being ~ade to the trustees of the trust but the 
donP-es of the gift are the beneficiaries under the 
trust. 
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It should be noted that the effect of these conclusions 
is that the focus is placed on the trustees as the persons 
to uhom the disposition is made and on the property which 
passes from the donor to the trustees. In this respect 
they support the proposition put forward in this paper that: 
Where there is a creation of a trust the property comprised 
in the disposition is the actual property which the donor 
transfers to the trustees. 
There is an obvious contrast batween this result and 
the result which occurs if different conclusions are reached 
above. For example, if Starke J•s. 52 view that the various 
equitabl0 interests under a trust each constituted a separate 
disposition was to be accepted or, alternatively, if the 
vieu that the creation of a trust results in a dispos~tion 
to the beneficiaries under the trust was accepted, then the 
focus would be on the beneficiaries as the persons to whom 
the disposition is mode and on the property which passes 
from the donor to the beneficiaries. In these circumstances 
the proposition put forward in this paper uould not be valid 
because the property comprised in the disposition uould be 
the property transferred from the donor to the beneficinries 
under the trust - that is, the equitable interests of the 
beneficiaries in the property transferred by the donor to 
the trustees. 
S? 
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This crucial distinction will be discussed further 
a fter examining the two lines of authority which exist 
on the question of the subject-matter comprised in the 
disposition. It is to this issue uhich the paper now 
turns. 
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IV. The 'PROPERTY COMPRISED' in a DISPOSITION 
This is the most import2nt issue for the purposes of 
this paper. Under the Act it is necessary to ascertain 
the 'property comprised' in a disposition in only two 
. t 53 circums ances: 
(1) In order to determine the issue raised in this paper -
namely, whether a donor has been excluded from the 
property 'comprised in' a disposition under the first 
limb of section 11(1) or under section 12(1)(a). 
(2) In order to value property at the date of disposition 
(under sections 10 and 11) or at death (under section 12). 54 
In the New Zealand context few problems have arisen in 
the valuation area. It is significant to note that where the 
property is to be valued at the date of death under section 12, 
thnre is express provision in subsection (2) of that section 
for the tracing and valuation of the property substituted 
'for the property originally comprised in that settlement, 
trust, or other disposition of property'. 
It is submitted that this provision is a strong indication 
that the property originally comprised in a disposition by 
w~y of trust is the actual property transferred by the donor 
to the trustees and not merely the equitable interests of 
the donee in that property. For exanple, the provision 
drems the 'property comprised in any• disposition 'to include 
53ndams and Richardson, supra n.3 p.87. 
54 section 18. 
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the proceeds of its sale or conversion•. This would seem 
to be inconsistent with the view th3t the property 
'comprised in' the disposition is merely the equitable 
interests of the donee in thnt property. 
It should be noted at this point thst uhile the two 
conflicting lines of authority to be discussed here appear 
on the face of it to be considering different issues - that 
i 8 , the cases uhich have followed the Hall's case approach 
have been primarily concerned with the reservation-retention 
question, while the cases uhich have followed the Sn ddon's 
ca s e approach have been primarily concerned with the valuat i on 
qu e~ tion - it is suggested neverthzl e ss th3t thi s is not a 
real ground for distinction for the purpo s es of this paper. 
It should be recognised that these cases arising fro~ other 
jurisdictions are only of persuasive authority having regard 
to the different statutory language under which they were 
decided. Also, it would be extremely unlikely that the words 
'property comprised in' under sections 11 and 12 would be 
given different interpretations dependinQ on the issue be fore 
the Court unless giving the words the same interpretation 
uould lead to an unreasonable or absurd result. 
The Hall's Case Approach 
55 In 1900 the case of Enrl Grey v Attorn e y General went 
bofore the House of Lords. The donor had, in that case, 
55 r, 1 0900J ,'\.C. 124. 
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conveyed real estate, leaseholds and personalty to tha donee 
by deed. The donee in turn covananted (int er alia) to pay 
certain annuities and mortgage and other debts, to pay an 
annual rent charge of £4,000, to pay all the donor's funeral 
and testam2ntary expenses and to pay all his debts. In the 
event of the donees death in the donor's lifotine or of any 
breach of covenant by the donee, the donor had power to 
revoke the deed. 
The Crown claimed estate duty upon the principle value 
of all the property comprised in the deed u der the equivalent 
of section 11. 56 Lord Halsbury L.C. said: 57 
••• no~hing appears to me much more plain than this, that 
uhat the Act of Parliament intended to prevent uas that 
what has been described as a gift should nevertheless 
reserve to the settlor sane benefit, or sane part of that 
which purported to be given inter vivas. In this case 
can anybody doubt that something has been reserved to the 
settlor? The settlement itself has reserved £4,000 a year, 
and has reserved a right also on the part of the ssttlor 
that all his debts up to the period of his death should be 
paid, and the payment secured by the estate. 
A similar conclusion had been reached five years earlier 
by the Court of Appeal in Attorney General v Uo~rall. 58 Hero 
the donor was entitled to a nortgage debt charged on land. 
56sectio n 2(1)(c) Finance Act 189~ and section 38 Customs and 
Inland Revenue Act 1881 ( as amended by section 11 Customs and 
Inland Revenue Act 1889). 
57 
L1900~ A.c. 126 I : Lords r~acnaghten, f1orris, Shand and James 
concurred. 
58 Beg~ 1 o.a. 99_ 
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The mortgagors conveyed the equity of rede~ption to the 
donor's son for consideration (provided by the son himself) 
and the donor then released the mortgage debt. By the same 
deed which gave effect to this transaction •and obviously 
as part of the saGe transaction' , the son convenanted to 
pay to the dona= an annuity during his lifetime . 
Under the same provision as that considered in Earl Grey•s 
case, the Court found that possession of the property was not 
assumed and retained by the donee •to the entire exclusion 
of any benefit to the donor by contract or otherwise•. 59 
Th2 case uhich seems to h2ve narked the turning point in 
this line of authority is 60 In re Cochrane. In th~t cnso 
the donor, by way of settlement, conveyed to trustees the 
su~ of £15,000 invested on mortgage on trust to pay out of 
the income a sum of £575 to his daughter for life. After her 
death the sum of :1s,ooo was to be held on trust for such 
child or children of the daughter ns she should appoint. In 
default of appointment th8re was provision for division amongst 
the children equa ly. Pou~r was givnn to the daughter to 
appoint by will to her husband for his life an annuity of £300 
in the event of his sulviving his wife. If no child of the 
daughte~ should attain a vested interest in the trust funds 
they were to be h2ld in trust for the donor absolutely . Also , 
59
,i,rid 105 per Lord Esher f1.ll. 
108 per A.C. S::iith L.J. 
107 pe~ Lopes L.J. 
sri QgosJ 2 1.11. 626 : ~9oGJ 2 I.R. 200. 
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there was a trust of the balance of the yenrly income for 
the donor absolutely. The mortgage in which the £15,000 
uas invested produced £675 per annu~ - therefore the donor 
received a ysarly income of around i100 out of the trust 
property. 
It uas apparently not the usual practice of the Inland 
Reven ue Department to bring a clai~ for estate duty in such 
cases and it was the decision of the House of Lords in 
Lorri Grey v Attorney General which prompted it to raise the 
action in this 61 case . 
It is the judgment of Palles C.B. in the Divisional 
62 Court which provides the starting point for the line of 
authority which followed In re Cochrane. In the Appeal Court 
all three judges63 accepted the conclusion and reasoning of 
the Chief Baron and it uas on the decision in this case that 
the Judicial Co~mittee relied in Hall's case. 
The Craun contended 64 that because of the ultimate trust 
for the donor, subject to the events specified in the settlement, 
of the entire corpus of the fund after the doath of the 
daughter and, secondly, the trust for the donor of the surplus 
of the income from the £15,000 during the life of the daughter, 
tho possession and enjoyment under the deed was prevented 
from being one • to the entire exclusion of the settlor , or 
of any benefit to hin' . 
6 1 
[19061_ ~I 2 I.R . 200 at 204 per Holmes J. 
62 
r1905~j 2 I.R. 626 . 
6 3 
[1 9 0 6] 2 I. R • 2 0 0 : a t 2 01 p er lJ a 1 k er C • : a t 2 0 3 p er FitzGibbon L.J. : at 20t1 per Holrnos L.J. 
64 
Supi;::a n . 56. 
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Th e response by Palles C.B. to this contention is 
vitally important. He said: 65 
This contention assumes that the subject matter of 
the 'gift' effected by the settlement is the entire 
equitable interest in the £15,000 , and upon that 
assumption I think the contention would be correct. 
This assumption, however, is contested by the appellant; 
and, therefore, whether it is, or is not, correct in low 
is the question for us • 
••• The question turns upon the meaning of the word 
'gift' in the statute. In such a case as the present, 
is the subject matter of the gift the entire interest in 
the capital sum , or is it only the beneficial interest 
of uhich the settler is, or may be divested by the 
dispositions. 
With respect I think this is correct. As has already 
been indicated the relevant legislation (the equivalent of 
sections 11(1) and 12(1)(a)) only operates where the interest 
has been reserved out of that uhich was given and not where 
the interest has been kept back and not given at all. Clearly 
therefore the vital issue is: What is the subject-matter 
comprised in the disposition? Having established the answer 
to this question there should be no real difficulty in 
determining whether the interest which the donor hQs has 
boen reserved or retained. 
Palles C.B. concluded that there Lias no bE1nefit reserved 
to the settler out of the gift . He argued that even hod 
there not been an ultimate trust contnincd in the settle ont 
SS r:_1905-1 2 I R 62 ~ G36 11 ~ • • b , • 
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nevertheless , 'there would have been a resulting trust to 
the donor, to the extent to which the trusts expressed in 
the dead did not exhaust the entire equitable interest in 
the fund'. He then considered the 'simplest' situation 
uhore there has been a mere declaration of trust by the donor 
to hold a sum of money on trust for his son for life and 
thereafter for such of his son's children as would ansuer 
t . 1 d . t. 66 a par icu ar escrip ion: 
In such a case , uhat would have been the gift? The 
legal interest did not pass; therefore the subject-
matter of the gift could not be measured by reference 
to that interest. The only equitable interest which 
was capable of passing consisted of the inter ests 
provid e d for the s on and hi s childr en. Tha r sidu c 
of the equitable interest remained in th settlor. It 
did not pass, it never moved. In what conceivable 
sense can it be said that it was given? 
The essence of what Palles C.B. was saying is that a 
declaration of trust does not involve any actual conveyance 
or transfer of property and therefore the only intere s ts 
uhich are given are those equitable interests which tho 
s ettlor expressly disposes of. Uith respect I do not think 
t his is correct . 
According to the provisions under consideration in that 
c a s e property passing on death is deemed to include any 
'property taken ••• under a disposition purporting to operate 
6 6 .d 1cm . 
33. 
ns an immediate gift inter vivas whether by way of transfer, 
delivery , declaration of trust, or otherwise'. It is sub -
mitted that the scheme of this definition is to catch trust 
dispositions which do not involve nn actual transfer o 
conveyance of property to trustees . 67 
A declaration of trust may be regarded as a transfer 
of the trust property from the settlor as ouner to the settlor 
as trustee . There is support for this proposition in the 
judgment of Lord Reid in Sneddon's case where he considered 
the situation where a donor simply makes a declaration of 
trust with himself as sole trustee . He said68 uith reference 
to the same legislation as th3t consider2d in In re CochranJ : 
In that case , it is argued, no property actually p3ssos 
when the gift is made and the 'property taken' must be 
the rights conferred and taken by the beneficiariec 
under the declaration of trust. But that view only leads 
to another difficulty . If the terns of the declar3tio~ 
are such that there is no inmediate vesting of the fee, 
then on that view I do not see how there can bo any 
immedi2te gift of tha fee bocause there cannot b a gift 
until there is someone to take it. Uhat h3ppens in such 
a case is that, although the title to the property is 
still held by the donor, the property ceases to belong to 
him , and all beneficial rights of property pass away from 
the donor as an individual to hi~self as trustee . I think 
that that can be regarded as a real p ssing of property 
and therefore the analy~is which is volid in the ordinary 
case is still valid in this case. 
67 f\nt8d 1;.Uhere a sir.iil<::ir orgunent is made in respect of 
...,ection 2(2) . 
6 
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If Palles C. B. was wrong in his reasoning then the 
rest o f his judgment is open to severe criticism. Returning 
to the hypothetical declaration of trust situation , the 
Chief Baron concluded that in such a case there would be 'an 
entire exclusion of the donor from the property taken under 
the disposition by way of gift' because the property passing 
wo uld be the i nterests provided for the son and the children 
only . Ha v ing reached this conclusion with regard to the 
hypothetical it uas then a simple matter for the lewrned 
Judge to find , 0 as in these questions of revenue, m tters 
of mere conveyancing form .:ue imr:iaterial; an ue are to view 
the substance only of the transactions, and as 'gift' in the 
context means 'beneficial gift'~ that in the actuJl cas8 
ber ore hir:i there had b8en no reservation out of th~ property 
. 69 91.ven . 
Applying this reasoning to the trust for the donor of 
the surplus incone during the daughter's life, Palles C. B • 
. d 70 sa 1 : 
\.Jhat LJciS given to r~rs D:iy rthe daughter] IJas not tho 
entire incone during her life . It was no more than ~575 
a year , parcel of that incone. The beneficial interest 
i n the surplus above that sum did not pass . It remained 
i n Sir Henry Cochrane [the d8nor] . It was not given ••• 
The receipt by Sir Hen=y of the surplus of the yearly 
inconc, above the £575, to which Mrs Dy was entitled , was 
not a participation in the gift . 
thing altogether outsidr the gift . 
Thnt surplus was some-
It follows that there 
was not any reservation of any benefit to tho sett l er 
out of the oift . 
69 ~gosj 2 r.n. 626, 637 . 
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Howevsr, while the value of the judgment may be limited 
b0cause of the process of reasoning folloued by Palles C.B., 
the validity of the conclusion has been supported by a line 
of authority which has folloued. 
Before turning to these cases, it should be pointed out 
that in In re Cochrane the earlier cases of Attornev G3neral v 
Uorrall and Earl Grey v ~ttorney G8neral were distinguished 
on the ground that the benefits back to the donor in tho~e 
ca~es uere secured by personal covenants entered into by the 
don8e collaterally and in reference to the gift - some arising 
out of the property actually conveyed and a3sign2d by w y of 
gift to the don8e. 
The Judicial Committe in c.s.o.(,J.S.U.) v Per p~tucil 
Trustee Co. Ltd (Hall's C3se) 71 considered that the situation 
.·hich they had to consider was covered by the decision in 
In re Cochrane. It also agreed ~ith the Court in the latter 
case that At.torney General v IJorrall ~:rnd Eo.rl Groy v l\ttornAy 
General were distinguish~ble on their fncts. 
In Hall's case the settlor Gettlcd sh,res on trustees 
to hold the corpus for his son during his minority on trusts 
for the son's maintenance, advancement or benefit and th8n, 
on his attaining 21 , to transfer the surplus to the son 
ab:, olutely. The settler was one of the five trusteee and 
ren, ined legal ounsr of the shares. There wns no gift over 
in the event of the ~on's death before he att3inod n vested 
71 
[194~ r'I.C. 425. 
36. 
interest and therefore the settlor would have been entitled 
on resulting trust. On the death of the settlor the revenue 
3Uthorities cloimed that the shares, the subject of the 
settlement, had formed part of the settlor ' s dutiable estate 
under a provision similar to section 11. 72 
One of the questions to be determined by the Judicial 
Committee was: Uhat was the property comprised in the gift, 
was it the shares themselves or only a particular kind of 
interest in the shares? Th e Supreme Court of New South ~ales 
had based its decision on the view that the gift us a gift 
of the shares. 73 The High Court of Austrolia 74 however 
rev8r3ed the decision of the lower Court, the four leRrned 
jurlges boing substantially unanimous in their opinions. 
Rich A.C.J. was of the opinion that what was given was tho 
beneficial interest in the sharas created by the set tlement, 
and that the donee was the son. 
The gift in this case was a 
75 He said : 
gift to the son by the 
creation of a trust for the beneficial interest in 
the shares. 
72 section 102 ( 2 )( d ) N. S. W. Stamp Duties Act 1920. 
73 See [1 94~1 A.c. 425, 436- 37 . 
The Supreme Court was also of the op1n1on that the donee of the gift was the body of trustees. However, with respect this finding is incorrect. 
See Ante , Pt' J..c--i..-z 
71! ) (1941 64 C.L.R. 492 . 
7Sibid 500 . 
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Similarly , Starke J . was of the opinion that the 
property comprised in the gift was not the shares, but 'the 
subject given or the interests in the property created or 
limited by the act of disposition of the property• . 76 
The Judicial Committee agreed with the High Court of 
Australia . Lord Russell of Killowen , in delivering the 
judgment of their Lordships, said : 77 
• •• the property comprised in the gift was the equitable 
interest in the eight hundred and fifty shares, which was 
given by the settler to his son . The disposition of that 
interest uas effected by the creation of a trust, i.e., 
by tr2nsferring the legal ownership of the shares to 
truste es , and declaring such trusts in favour of the son 
as woro co-extensive with the gift; whether the son 
alone was the donee (as their Lordships think) or whether 
the ~on and the body of trustees together constltuted thA 
donee, seems im~aterial . The trustees alone uere not the 
donee. They were in no sense the object of the sottlor's 
bounty ••• 
• • • • the son was (through the medium of the trustees) 
immediately put in such bona fide beneficial possession 
and enjoyment of the property comprised in the gift as the 
natu re of the gift and the circumsta,1ces permitted. 
On this basis the Judicial Committee re~soned that there 
w s an entire exclusion of the deceased or of any benefit to 
him . 
76
ibid 505. 
77 LJ9t1"iJ A. C. 425, 439-40. 
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Hall's case was followed in the Canadian case M.N.R. v 
National Trust Co. Ltd. 78 There, by deed of settlement, the 
sett ler transferred to trustees certain securities in trust 
to pay the annual income arising therefrom to his daughter 
during the lifetime of the settlor. On the settlor's death , 
the trustees were to transfer the securities and the 
acc umulated income therefrom to the daughter absolutely . 
Houever , the settlement provided that if the daughter should 
die before the settler the trustees should transfer the 
securities and the accumulated income to the settlor 
abuo lutely. 
K . J . d 79 erw1.n • sai : 
So far as the father is concerned tho principle is woll 
understood that a contingent reversion reserved to the 
donor of the property is not reserved out of the gift 
but is something not comprised in it. 'Th e property, 
the subject matter of the gift ', to use the phrnseolo½y 
of clause ( g) [s ection 7(1) Dominion Succession Duty Act), 
is the daughter's equitable interest nnd the d ughter 
assumed such bona fid o possession and enjoyment of the 
property immediately upon the making of the gift as the 
nature of the gift and the circumstances per~itted . In 
similar circumstances it was held to be so by the Judici3l 
Committee in C.S.D. ( N. S.U.) v Perpetual Trustee Co . Ltd . 
r94:TI fl .C. 425, and thnt decision should be followed ••• 
The only other condition to be met under clause (g) is 
that actual possession and enjoyment should be assumed 
and retained by the daughter •to tho entire exclusion of 
the donor or of any benefit to him '. It logically follows 
78 ~ 948] 
79 
lJ 948] 
C.T.C. 339 
C.T.C. 339, 351 . 
S.C . R. 127. 
39. 
from the principle set forth above, that is, that 
the reversion of the father is something not comprised 
in the gift to the daughter, th3t the former wns excluded 
from any benefit in the subject matter of the gift. 
80 In Oakes v C.S.D. (N.S.W.) the donor had executed a 
deed under which he held property in trust for himself and 
his four children as tenants in common in equal shares . Lord 
Reid, deliveri ng the judgment of their Lordships, applied 
Hall ' s case: 81 
If a donor reserves to himself a beneficial interest 
i n property and only gives to the donees such beneficial 
interests as remain after his own reserved interest hos 
been satisfied, it is now uell established that such 
reservation of a beneficial interest does not involve 
any benefit to the donor within th3 meaning of the 
L• 82 
S8Ct-J.On. 
However in this case the deed gave the settlor uide 
powers of ~anage~ent and, in particular, provided thot in 
addition to reimbursing himself of all expenses incurred 
in the administration of the trust, he was entitled to 
remuneration for all work done by him in managing the trust 
property . In holding that this was an interest reserved 
out of that which was given , Lord Reid said : 83 
OO [1954j A. C. 57 . 
Olilii.Q_ 76 . 
82 Su11ra n . 72. 
83 Ugs4] /\ . C. 57, 79. 
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The contrast is between reserving a beneficial 
interest and only giving such interests as remain 
on the one hand, and on the other hand reserving 
power to take benefit out of, or at the expense of , 
interests which are given. 
Su" -:iary 
The basic proposition established by the Hall's case 
approach is that where a disposition is effected by the 
creation of a trust the donor only disposes of those equitable 
interests taken by the done s of the gift. Any interest 
uhich the donor reserves to himself is not reserved out of 
the gift but is something not co~p=ised in it except uhere 
that interest arises out of, or at the expense of, interests 
wh ich are given . 
Consequently, the donee is put in 'bona fide possession 
and enjoy~ent' of the property (as far as the nature of the 
gift and the circumstances permic) and thera is an 'entire 
exclusion of the deceased or of any benefit to him' . 
Therefore the provisions in section 11(1) and section 12(1)(a) 
do riot apply. 
The Snaddon ' s Case Approach 
84 It was decided in Lord Strathcona v I.R.C . that in 
the case of an absolute disposition the property to be valued 
at the date of the donor's d~ath was the actual thing which 
harl originally be a n given. However where there is a disposition 
by way of trust the position is not quite so clear . 
l,1 Ll929J S. C. 800, 805-807. See also Attorn8y General for 
Ontnrio v flationnl Trust C • Ltd. ()9~1j • A.C. 818, 822-23 : 1\-:torn oy C"'ne:-'11 v De µ..- ~vil.l.e Q90Q} 1 Q.8. 223, 231 . 
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There is authority for the proposition that such 
dispositions are to be regarded as standing on a different 
footing from absolute gifts when considering their liability 
85 to duty. The facts in In re Pavne, Poplett v Attorney General 
•Je re rather cor.1plicated but, in effect, the settlor conveyed 
to the trustees £10POO and an option. The trustees exercised 
the option and bought shares and there were also changes of 
investment and receipts of bonus shares. When the settlor 
died less than three years later the t~ust fund was worth 
~5C1,00 0. 
At first instance, Sinonds J. 86 looked on trust prope ty 
subject to a settlement which persisted to the settler's death 
as an immutable, continuing entity so there was no room for 
a pplying any 'follouing-the res' doctrine which might have been 
i~plicit in Lord Strathcona•s case. 
87 The Court of Appeal agreed with the decision of 
Sino nds J. but there was such a difference of opinion between 
th2 various Judge~ 2s to the property which had to be valued 
that it is difficult to see how In re P~y~e c n be regarded 
as definite authority for any proposition. It is difficult 
to determine whether the case stands for the proposition that 
the property taken was the settled fund or that, whatever the 
nature of the property taken by virtue of the trust, it was to 
b8 valued at the date of denth by taking the value of the trust 
und at that date. 
85 
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The High Court of Australia in Trustees, Executors & 
Aoency Co. Ltd. v F.C.T. (Teare's case) 88 thought that the 
latter of these explanations was the correct one. There 
the settlor had settled money which was subsequently 
invested in shares by the trustees. All the members of 
the High Court were of the opinion that although the settle-
ment was one of money, ''the property' to be valued at the 
deat h of the deceased is represented by the shares into 
which the money had been transmogrified•. 89 
911 However in Vicars v C.S.D. ( N.S. W.) the majority of 
the High Court cl early took In re Payne and Teare 1 s cas to 
es t a blish that the subject-matter of a trust disposition is 
the sett led fund. Only Latham C.J. in his dissenting jud9msnt 
drew a distinction between the subject-matter problem and 
the valuation problem. He held that the property comprised 
in the gift in Vicars' case was the money that had been paid 
to the trustees, and he rejected any suggestion that this 
money could be followed into the trust fund in a case which 
did not involve a valuation a3 at the date of denth. 91 
Thi s was the rathP-r uncertain state of the law whon 
Sneddon v Lord Advocate92 came before th House of Lords. 
80 
(1941) 65 C. L. R. 134. 
OCJ ib...i.d.. 140 per Rich J. See also 143 per Sbuke J · 
145 per Williams J. 
9 
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g 2 [-19541 A • C. 2 5 7. 
43. 
In that case the settlor had settled £5000 on trust with 
a direction th2t the sum, or the investments representing 
it, be held and applied for the settlor's daughter for life 
nnd then to her issue, uith a provision on failure of issue. 
The trustees invested the money in shares which value 
increased to £9250 on the settlor's death two years later. 
The Crown relied on section 38(2)(a) of the Customs 
and Inland Revenue Act 1881 and section 2 of the Finance Act 
1894 together with the decision of Simonds J. in In re P3yne. 
It argued that the trust fund was a continuing corpus and 
that what had tc be v2lued uas that property which the 
beneficiaries got under the trust. It thor fore claimed 
d ~th duties on the value of the settled fund on the 3ettlor's 
deJth - that is, ~9250. 
Howev er the House of Lords held, with one dissent, that 
the dutiable value o( the gift was ~5000 and not the value 
of the shares at death. 
Lord Morton of Henryton said: 93 
What, then, is th e property which is dce.ed to pass? 
The Statute sc1ys it is the 'property taken' under the 
disposition made by the trust"'r. r~y Lords, I feel no 
doubt that the property taken under that disposition 
was the sum of £5000 . That was the only property which 
passed fro~ the truster, and it was the only property 
taken by the truste .s fron the tru8ter under his 
disposition. They took that property, of course, as 
9
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trustees for the beneficiaries under the deed of trust. 
The truster never owned the 5,000 Creamola shares and, 
therefore, these shares could not be 'taken' under any 
disposition made by him. 
In dealing specifically with the main contention of the 
Craun (above), the House of Lords treated In re P3yne as 
having decided that the property which is taken by virtue 
of a trust disposition is the settled fund. This proposition 
was strongly rejected by the majority of their Lordships. 
Lord Morton said: 94 
Counsel for the Crown submitted that uhat was settled 
was a trust fund, and that a trust fund retains its 
identity as a trust fund notwithst 2n ding any ch3nges in 
its invostment. I agree that the £5000 became a tru~t 
fund as soon as it passed from the settlor to the 
trustees, but the property which the trustees 'took' 
from the settlor was f.5000. 
Can Hall's case and ~neddon's case be Reconciled? 
The conclusion reached in Sneddon's case is clearly in 
conflict with that reached in Hall's case. 
Kitto J. said: 96 
95 In Gale v F.C.T. 
Yet there may be difficulty in applying Sneddon's case nd 
at the same time giving effect to the principle in Hall's 
case • ••• It seems hardly satisfactory to say, with th J 
learned editors of Dymond's Death Duties, 12th ed. (1955), 
p . 148, that in such a case the principle of Sneddon's 
case breaks down. 
94
i.tu_g_ 265-66 . 
<J !:) 
(1960) 102 C.L.R. 1 . 
g;- ibid 27. 
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The learned J udge did not find i t necessary to attempt 
to resolve the difficulty . 
One commentator 97 has suggested that these ttJo cases 
ca n be reconciled because in Sneddon ' s case the property 
passi ng to the trustees was the complete legal and beneficial 
interest i n £5000 , whereas i n Ha l l ' s case the settlor with-
held the be n e f i c ial in terest to t he extent o f his resulti ng 
tru s t and it did not therefore pass from him to the trustees . 
It is argued that because the settlor in Sn e ddon's case did 
not etain any inter est in the sum which he paid to the 
t rustees , t he question whet her the property taken uas the 
mo noy itself or th u intere s ts in that money cr eated in the 
beneficiaries of the trust simply did not arise . With 
r e s pect I do not think that th i s is correct . 
Th a House of Lords in Sneddon ' s case uere emphatic that 
the p~imar y iss ue for consideration in such a case is 1 tho 
a scertainment of the property ' taken ' undar the dispositio n 
purporting to operate as a n immediate gift , whether outright 
98 or by ua y of settlement '. Their Lord s hips clo rly ,aw th e 
contrast betwe en legal and beneficial intere s ts passing from 
t h o donor . Lord f'lorton , for example , could see no logical 
disti nctio n ' for the present purpose ' between an outright 
gift to C, a declaratio n that the donor held property on trust 
f or C, and a transfer to trustees to be held on trust for c:99 
l)7 
Y.F . R. Grbich , ' Dispositions with Strings ', ~uora n . 14 , 91 - 92 . 
98 
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In each case the property taken is the cash or shares 
which the donor gives or transfers or whereof he declares 
trusts . The tax under section 2(1)(c) is a tax upon 
' property taken under a disposition ••• purporting to 
operate as an immediate gift inter vi vas '. It is a 
tax upon certain defined property, and it is necessary 
to look at the moment when the gift was m de in order 
to see what that property was ; it is not a tax upon 
beneficial interests in property and it matters not 
whether the gift was made (to quote the subsection) 
' by way of transfer, delivery , declaration of trust or 
o therwise ' • 
. ·1 1 L . 1 d. d1 00 ·th th · Simi ar_y, ord Reid express y isagree wi e view 
taken by Scott L.J. in the Court of Appe 1 in In 1 01 r~ Payn~ 
that the property given ' was simp y the tot lity of equitable 
rights created by thot declaration of trust in the beneficiaries ' ; 
no other form of kind of property was the raal subject of the 
gift ; the transfer to the trustees of the legal title was 
r1ere mac:1inery to effect the gift. 
It is suggested therefore that if there had been a 
resu lting trust to the settler in Snedrlon's c·se as there 
was in H,ll's case, the House of Lords in the formor would 
st·11 have found that the property which the trustees ' took' 
fro m the settler was the £5000. On this view it is h,rd to 
seJ how the two cases could be reconciled . 
1
( 8 ibid 275. 
1 B940J 1 Ch. 576, 589-90. 
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1 02 It has already been suggested that where there has 
been a disposition of property by virtue of the 'creation 
of a trust' the only disposition involved is the disposition 
from the donor to the trustees (although the donees of the 
disposition are the beneficiaries under the trust ). With 
respect , it is submitted that the approach taken by the Courts 
in the Hall's case line of authority is ba~ed on an erroneous 
assumption - namely, that in these cases the disposition is 
to the donees ( the beneficiaries) of the trust . For example , 
Lord Russell in Hall's case said: 103 
• • • the pro~erty comprised in the gift was the equitabl2 
interest in the eight hundred and flfty shares, which was 
qiv?n by th e settl r to his ::; .n [th n do:1e8 undor the trust] . 
Statements made by Lord R dcliffe in St Aubyn v Attorney 
1 04 General support this conclusion. After reviewing tho 
a~pr oach taken in In re Cochrane and H3ll's case his Lordship 
. d 1 05 sa i : 
All these decisions proceed upon a common principle , 
namely, that it is the possession and enjoyment of the 
actual property given that has to be t3~en account of, 
and th~t if that property is , as it may be, a limited 
equit3ble interest distinct frc~ another such interest 
which is not given or an interest in property subject 
to an interest that is retained , it is of no consequence 
for this purpose that the retained interest remains in the 
beneficial enjoyment of the person who provides the gift. 
1 02 ~ /\n.., ':!. p ;.... 
103 
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It ~ust be conceded that if the disposition by way of 
trust is a disposition to the donees, and not a disposition 
to the trustees as this paper suggests, then there is a 
strong argument to be made in favour of the proposition 
that the subject-matter of the disposition is those interests 
which the donees take . In effect the difference is essentially 
one of timing . If the dispositio n is to the trustees then , 
according to the proposition put forward in this paper , the 
ac tual property with its entire legal and beneficial interests 
must be the subject-matter of the disposition because that 
is what is transferred from the donor to the trustees. If 
however the disposition is to the donees th8n, in a conceptual 
sense , the disposition does not ar.ise until after the actu3l 
property is transferred to the trustees because the donees 
ha ve no rights in the property until it becomes vested in the 
trustees . In these circumstances it is arguable that the 
Hall's case approach is correct and that the property comp ised 
in the disposition is only those interests which will, 
immediately or in the future, ba taken by the donees . For 
the reasons outlined earlier however , it is submitted that 
this approach is not the correct one . 
The principle enunciated in Sneddon's case was accepted 
by the High Court of Austra l ia in C.S.D . v Gale 106 where it 
w13 held that the property comprised in the gift was that which 
th d t d . th D. C J . d 1 O? o onor pare ui • ixon • • s~1 : 
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There is much in the speeches of their Lordships who 
forn the majority in Sneddon v Lord Advocat'3 [195aj 
A. C. 257 that supports the view that in legislation 
such as that und r consideration you look for what has 
been alienated by the deceased . The legislqtion there 
considered was cast in a different form and moreover was 
referential but plainly enough Lord Morton regarded the 
form of the property as it passed from the donor as a 
t est ( ibid 264 ) and s o did Lord MacDermott (ibid 267, 268) 
a n d Lord Reid ( ibid 273 , 274) • • • 
In the end one may say for the present purposes it comes 
down to the question what did the dece sed alienate . 
Again in Gale v F . C.T. 108 the High Court decided that 
whG_e an initial gift of noney had been made the property 
tn bo valued at the date of de th was the money itsalf and 
not the property in which it had been invested. The Court 
took the view that Sneddon ' s case was inconsi3tant with 
Teare ' s case and Vicars' case, but chose to follow the House 
of Lords ' decision. Although the issue did not directly 
arise in this case , the High Court followed the reasoning 
in Sneddon's case on the nature of the property which passes 
by virtue of a settlement. 
There is however a group of cases which h s pre sented thn 
Courts with particular difficulties in determining tho question 
of the subject-matter comprised in the disposition . It is 
proposed at this stage to ex~min3 these caso3 in order to 
dntermine if possible what effect they might have on the 
goneral principle laid down in Sneddon's caso. 
1 
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SPECIAL CASES - The Sub3tnnca Approach and the Snedd8n Principle 
The type of situation which occurs in these cases is well 
illustrated by the Australian case, Union Trustee Co~ of 
Australia Ltd. v Llebb. 109 In that case tha donor promised 
his wife that he would give her a house as a present. It 
was arra~ged between the wife and the donor that she should 
purchase the house and the donor would supply her uith the 
purchase money. 
The question faced by the Court (inter alia) was: Llhat 
was the subject-matter comprised in the gift, the monPy or 
the house? Griffith C.J. expressed the view that the sub3tanco 
of the matter was preferable to form and he held that the 
l · t f th ·~t the house- 110 su JJec o e 911 was _ I8aacs J. on th~ 
th h d th ht th t th . f' f th 111 o er an oug a e 91 ~ was o e mo~ey: 
The house never was the property of the husband, 
and no one can give away as his own property that 
he never had . The facts are that the wife herself 
purchased in her oun na~e and on her own behalf, 
and signed the contract creating a contractual 
obligation on her own part to pay the purchase 
money . 
The situation which arose in Potter v Lord Advocato 112 
was slightly different. There the father, wanting to provide 
his son with an opening in business, entered into negotiations 
which resulted in a private company being formed to acquire 
1 
QtJ (1 91 5) 1 9 C. L . R • 6 69 . 
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the business of a firm . It was the agreed intention of 
all parties that the son should acquir~ sharPS in th_ 
company and become a director. 
At a meeting of the company at which shares were 
allotted, the son presented a letter of application for 
10,000 one pound shares , together with a cheque for £10,000, 
and the shares were duly allotted to him. He had received 
the cheque from his father immediately beforehand, together 
with a letter to the effect that the cheque, which w s drawn 
in favour of the company, was to enable him to purchase the 
sh:ires . 
The Court was in no dcub::. as to the int .ntion of th 
pnr ties in transacting as they did and acknowledged that 
there uere a number of moans by which they could have achieved 
the same ends . In determining the subject-matter of the 
gift , the majority of the Court thought that r egard should 
be had to the exact form which the transactions took. 
Lord Mackintosh said : 113 
While it is true that what the son i~ the present case 
got at the end of the day through his father's bounty 
was shares in John Greig & Sons Ltd., I am unable to 
see how it can be said that he ' took' these shares 
' under a disposition' made by his father • • •• the 
father never at any time owned these shares or had 
any right over them. They cannot therefore, in my 
opinion, have been taken by the son under a disposition 
made by the father , far the latter never had any right 
in them or power to dispose of thorn . 
113
ibid 225. 
52. 
In reaching this conclusion his Lordship relied on 
the judg~ent of Lord Morton in Sneddon•s cnse. 114 Difficulty 
arises houever in reconciling this approach with some dicta 
of Lord Reid which appears in his judgrnent in Sneddon's 
115 case where he considers a situation in which the donor 
hands over money with instructions to use it in some particular 
w3y and the taker is obliged to follow these instructions. 
Lord Reid suggests that, in such a case, 'it might be said 
thnt the real subject of the gift is the investment'. Uith 
re3pect, I agree with the Court in Potter's case in expres3ly 
rejecting this suggestion. 116 
I suggest that this tentative dicta is inconsistent with 
enrlier reasoning in Lord Reid's judgment when ho is discussing 
the difference between the rights which the donor had in the 
property given and the rights which the trustees have in that 
117 property: 
••• by reason of their fiduciary position and of the 
directions of the truster, the trustees do not have 
the same freedom to deal with the property as the truster 
had: they ~re obliged to use tho rights of proporty 
which have come to them in certain ways and precluded 
from using them in other ways, but the property remains 
the same. 
114 
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There appears to be no real d:stinction , for present 
pu~poses, between the situation uhere property is handed 
ovEr to trustees for use under a trust for certain li~ited 
purposes and the situation where the property is given 
directly to the donee but, under the ter~s and concitions 
of the gift, he is to use it only in one porticu_ar way . 
The majority judgments in Sneddon ' s case and Potter ' s 
case and the reasoning of Isaacs J. in Webb's case all 
support the principla that it is not possible for the donor 
to dispose of property which h does not have any power over . 
Ho • ever these cases have all boen conc_rned uith the situation 
L' ~ore tho property has been gifted to the donee (or t .a 
:.::-ustee as the c2se may b!J) and th .. n transrnuted, either 
vo.:.untc:1 rily or as a condition of tho gift, into property 
which was never vested in the doncr. Different considerations 
appl y in the situa~ion where the donor, by c:1 series of 
transactions before the disposition to the donee (or trustee) 
takes place, is able to gift property which w s never vested 
in him. Tho nPxt two C3scs considored concern this type 
The facts of Rolli Brothers Trustee Co. Ltd . v InlGnd 
118 R8 venue Doo~rtnent are complicated by the fact that the 
ett lor's advise= was at the material time omployed by the 
co .. pany uh.ich wns to act as trustees for tho trusts which 
the settler intended to settlo. The sottlor c:1uthoriscd her 
1 
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adv iser to effect policies of life assurance on her life 
and to settle these on tru sts in favour of her grandsons. 
The proposal was made in the name of th trustee company 
and the settlo r covenanted to procure the issue of the 
polic y in the na~e of tha trustee. The premium on the 
polic y was paid out of proceeds of securitie3 of the settlor 
uh lch were reali sed by th e trustee company at the direction 
of the settlor's adviser a nd as agent for th9 settlor. 
It was held that in the circu~stances of the caso , the 
settlor had made a gift of the policies and not of the 
;Jremiums. Goff J. said: 119 
If the quotation er accc~tance of the propos· 1 h3d 
established a contract betu~en the trustee company 
and the insurance co~pany binding the trustee co~pany 
to take up the policy and pay the first premium, and 
to buy the annuity which had to be purchased as a term 
of the contract, th en clearly th e answer would be that 
the deceased gave only the money. Houever •••• it is cle3r 
that at the time the deceased tendered the premium th~ 
tru stee co~pany h8d not come under any liability to pay 
th e prP-r.iiu:;i. .. So, here, the deceased got the right, 
by paying thR preniu~, to require the insurance coDpany 
to issue a policy to the trustee company because tho 
insuranco conp 3n y ac cept ed it on that footing. 
The Court placed 0o~e reliance on the dicta of Lord Reid 
riir,cussed above , but, with respect, I submit that even if that 
d icta uc:is correct , uhich is extremely doubtful, it would have 
n, appl·cGtion in the pre vent case. Tho trustee company 
11 9
ibid 23 6 . 
55. 
received the money as a conduit pipe for payment to the 
insurance company it is true, but the trustee company handled 
tho money as agent for the settlor and not as trustees for 
the settlements which she had set up. It does appear therefore 
that this case is distinguish3ble from the situation which 
arose in Sneddon's case. 
The reasoning of the Court in the Ralli Brothers case 
does indicate that the Courts are prepared in some instances 
to ta~e a substance approach to the question of the subject -
matter comprised in a disposition. In the New Zealand case, 
Public Trustee v c.s.o., 120 the donor agr, din writing to 
pu:chase from the vendor a block of land for !10,350 and a 
deposit of £250 was paid. The contract was completed at the 
agreed date but at the donor's request the vandor executed 
a memorandum of transfer to the donor's wife. Payment W3S 
received by the vendor directly from the purchaser himself . 
Th . h ~h ·rt duty 121 bl th ~10 350 e issue was we~ er gi was paya e on e  , 
or on the government valuation of the land at the date of the 
gift which uas only £6,745. 
122 Salmond J. held: 
The transaction seems to me to be just as truly a gift 
of land as if the husband had first taken a conveyance 
from the vendor to himself in consideration of purchase 
money , and had then conveyed the land to his wife in 
1 2 o G 92 ~l 
121u j n( er 
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con ideration of natural love and affection . In order 
that a don8r should make a gift of property it is not 
necessary that he should first have that property vested 
in himself . He just as effectually makes the gift of 
it if he procures it to b0 transferred directly to donee 
by a vendor to uhom he himself pays the purchase money . 
The obvious difficulty ~hich arises on the facts of the 
Public Trustee case , for example, is that thore are two 
dispositions involved : the first is the payment by the husband 
to the vendor; the second is tho transfer of the land from 
the vendor to the wife . Can either of these dispositions 
consti tute a gift? If any gift is involved it is obviously 
3 gif t from the husband to tha wife but there has been no 
diroct disposition from the husband to the wifo. 
The Court in the above cnse got around the problem by 
looking at the real nature of the tr8ns3ction as a uhole , 
rather than at the mechanics by which that affect was achieved. 
fl sir:iilar approach was taken in Ch:-iduick v C.S.D. (N.s . u.) 123 
uhere th e equitable tenant for life paid for improvements 
to land ln his possession under a family settlement. 
held that theae pay~ents wnrc voluntary uispositions 
re~ai nder , 8n, operatin9 as gifts intor vivo3 to them . 
Chie f Justice said: 124 
'1 2 ::: (1 91 9) 1 9 S . R • 39 . 
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If A knowingly and volunt~rily spends his money in 
building upon B's land and with B's knowldge and 
approval he makes a gift to Bas eff0crively as if 
he handed him the money for the purpose of building 
on it himself. 
125 However in Finch v c.s.o. the Judicial Committee held 
t hat sums spent by the husband on alterations to the wife's 
property uhich was used as the family home, were not gifts 
ui thin ths meanin g of the Act. The paynents to the builder 
in this case uere held not to constitute dispositions to the 
ui fe because they were not ~ade with the intention or for 
th e purposes of improving the value of the wife' estate. 
Thi s rev e r se d th e e3rlior finding of the New Zeal a nd Curt 
12 6 o f ~ppeal who thought that the payment could be regarded 
as a disposition if it ha d the effect of a disposition without 
r egard to its purpo s e. 
Th e effect of tno deci s ion of th e Privy Council in Finch's 
c 2s e therefore is to restrict the s ub s tance approach t~ken 
in Ch0 dwick's case to those situations in which a disposition 
i s made for the ~urpose or object of benefiting third party. 
I t has be en suggested127 that the inclusion of para (f) in 
the definition of 'disposition of property• precludes the 
pos~ibility of a 'substance' approGch to the interpretation 
o f the gener3l words in the definition and that on their 
1 :, ~ [1 9 2 ~] A • C • 4 2 7 • 
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plain meaning the general uords of the definition can be 
applied only to transfers, assignments, pay~ents or other 
alienations of property uhich are made direct to the person 
benefiting. Indirect benefits must be caught by para (f) 
or by the Finch gloss on the general uo~ds which has the 
same requirement of intent. It is suggested that the 
re3ults in both the Ralli Brothers case and the Public Trustee 
case would be the same under this 'intention' test. 
The substance approach taken in Finch's case was adopted 
by the New Zealanrl Court of Appeal in O•erton's TrustPes v 
128 C.I.R .. In that case the husba d had a 1:fe interest in 
his wife's estate with the remainde~ to two daughters. The 
husband uho uas a trustee of the est2t 0 p2id from his own 
fund 0 the duty payable on his uifets estate and certain 
other administrative exp nses and debts owing by the estate. 
Thu payments which totalled ~21 ,597 wer~ r.8t reimbursed t~ 
the husbnnd in his lifetine nor repaid to his executors on 
h.:.s death~ 
The Commissioner in cluded the ~21,597 in the final 
~l ance of the husband's estate for the purposes of estate 
dJt y un der the predrccssor to section 12(1)(a) and (b). 
Cou nsel for the appellants however argued that the property 
co1; pri:Jed in the d.is;rnsition · s not the money sum but the 
r.xt inguishm ent of thn ch~r9c anrl thP d~:Jchnrgc of the 
obliga tions. 
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North P. delivering the judgment of the Court , said: 129 
Fr o;-i the beginning his [the husband's] intent ion uas 
to make a gift to his wife's estate of the money rsquired 
to meet these charges . The fact that ha paid the 
Commissioner and the creditors directly in our opinion, 
can make no difference. It must not be overlooked that 
he was a trustee of his wife's estate ; he could have 
just as easily have paid the £21 , 500 into the estate trust 
account and then drawn the several cheques necessar y to 
discharge the obligations of the estate to the Commis ioner 
of Inland Revenue and the other creditors . Lle see no 
reason for dealing with the matter in any different way 
because he took the simpler course of paying the £21 , 500 
directly to the Commissioner and to the creditors. It 
seems to us to be purely a matter of book~eeping nnd 
t~e result in law is the same. 
Significantly, in the case stated the nppellants had agreed 
to regard the paymsnts as gifts by Mr Overton to the trustees 
of his wife's estate . North P. considered that thny ucre 
'oound by the agreement' and found support for his decision 
in this fact (although the strength of his reasoning suggests 
that even if this 'agreement' had not existed, he would have 
~2ached the same conclusion). 130 It i~ implicit in this 
finding that the learned Judge took the view that in a 
di s position by way of trust the disposition is to the trustees 
a n the property co~prisr.d in the disposition is the property 
tr unsfr.rr d by the donor to the trustees. 
~ " 11 
J . ibid 882 . 
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This conclusion is supported by dicta in the judgmenc 
of North P •• Considering the issue of the reservation of 
th d th 1 J d "d 131 an interest by e onor, e earned u ge sai : 
If Mr Overton had executed a separate trust of the 
£21,500 in favour of his two daughters reserving to 
himself a life interest there could be no question 
that the settle~ent would be c~ught bys. 5(1)(j) 
para (i) [the equivalent of section 12(1 )( a]. 
In applying the substance approach in Overton's case the 
fJow Zealand Court of Appeal distinguished the earlier English 
132 Court of Appeal decision in Re Hall. Holland v Attorney General. 
The facts in that case were vary similar to those which arisn 
in Overton'n case . Mrs Hall, the life tenant in her hu~band's 
estate , paid the estate duty payable on the estato of :7,900. 
Upon her death the Commissioner claimed duty on the sum paid 
under the equivalent of section 11. 
In that case Lord Greene M.~., delivering the judg ,ent 
of the Court, said : 1 33 
In order to ansuer this question, it is neceJ~ary to 
ascertain the subject-matter of the gift ••• The pay~ent 
of £7 , 900 accomplished a dual purpose . It extinguished 
the liability of Mrs Hall as between herself and those 
interested in remainder to keep down the interest, 2nd 
it extinguished a charge on the inheritance. It u~s 
the extinguishment of that charge by means of a money 
131
1.bid 883 . 
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payment whi c h uas the subject-matter of the gift , 
and not the money payment itself. The fact that 
t~e money payment op_erated also to relieve Mrs Hall 
of a liability did not derogate from the completeness 
of that gift . It was not a reservntio~ fron the 
subject-matter of the gift, nor uas it a benefit 
conditioning the gift. As regards Mrs Hall, 
merely the extinguishment of her liability . 
Tompkins J. in the Supreme Court in Overton's 
it was 
1 34 case 
had distinguished Ra H2ll on the ground that it was decided 
upon the equivalent of section 11(1) and was therefore not 
an a uthority on section 12(1)(a) and (b) . With respect, 
thi0 begs the questio~. The basis, for the decision in 
Re Ha ll was th e finding that the oxting·Jishrirnnt of tho ch~ug2 
w2s the subj3ct-matter of the gift and it is suggested that 
the case would be good authority for the subject-matter issue 
whet her section 11 or section 12 was under considc~ation . 
A further distinction ua0 draun by tho Court of !\ppc:::il 
on the fact that in Re Hall, 'while the ectato duty was paid 
by ~~ rs Holl in 1911 she cJid nat relociso the ch"Jrgo on her 
135 h~sband's estate until 1920' . It had boon 3rgued on behalf 
of :he Crown in Re Hall "th<lt uhon Virs Hall paid the duty on 
UcJ r 
husband's estate , she obtained a charge upon it and this 
3ccepted by Morton J. in the Lower Court . 136 However 
in the Court of Appeal Lord Greeno M. R. did n t con s ider it 
1 3t, 
,196 ~3 1 rJ . Z. L. R • 603 , 607. -· . 
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necessary to express any opinion on the question because 
he con::;idered that the result would be the same tJhichevP.r 
. 137 view was taken . His Lordship accordingly determined 
the subject - matter of the gift uithout deciding whether or 
not Mrs Hall had obtained a chGr92 on the estate . It is 
submitted, with respect , therefore , th3t the distinction 
dr3wn on this basis by the Co urt of AppeGl in Overton's 
case is not a valid one. 
However the base s for distinguishin q Re Hall in Overton ' s 
138 ca~e were accepted in another ~Jew Zealand case , Tath~m v I.R . C • • 
In that case Mrs Tath am had a lifa interest in her husband's 
stat8 , them in asset of which was tho Homewood Station 
which uas subject to mortgages approximating £16,000. The 
t=ustees established a Mortgage Redemption Account to uhich 
were credited various amounts transferred fro~ Mrs Tathan ' s 
income account in her husband's estate . No other amounts 
ue~e ever paid into the account. Mrs Tatham was not reimbursed 
during her lifetime, nor were th e amounts ever returned to her 
incorne account. Upon he~ death the Cor-:r.rission r included 
thP above amounts in r~rs Tathn1 ' s estnte for de,th duty 
purposes . 
In the Supreme Court, Haslam J . h~d no hesitntion in 
app lying tt,o substance approach taken by the Court of Appeal 
i.n [lvprton'~ case. The le'-nnod Judge found thnt th3 c!ece2sod 
137 
1 All E. H. 10, 13 . 
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disposed of the £7,000 by way of gift to the trustees to 
be held by them on the trusts appearing in the will of tho 
husband even though he agreed th3t the sums were earmarked 
in advance by Mrs Tatham to reduce encumbrances . He said : 139 
The reasoning in Overton's case (p. 882 , lines 5-25) 
as applied to the facts here emboldens me at the outset 
to find that the deceased intended to make a gift to 
the estate at the time that each transfer was m3de and 
t hat the capital charge thereon to which she uas prima 
facie entitled did not arise , as her express intention 
at all times was to reduce the mortgages on the farm 
property for the benefit of her family. 
While Haslam J. applied the approach taken in Ovorton's 
c a ~o it is suggested that in fact the situation which aros 
in Tatham's case is more related to the type of situation which 
140 was examined by the Court in Potter's case. In effect 
Mrs Tatham had transferred sums to the trustees on the condition 
th8t they be used for a defined purpose - namely,~ reduction 
of the mortgage debts. According to the decision in Potter's 
case, the subject-matter of tho disposition in such a 0ituation 
must be the sums of money transferred to tho trustees to hold 
in the Mortgage Redemption Account. Significantly, th~ 
ultimate result under each of these approaches is the same. 
,·:1CJibid 599 . --
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Sumr.iary 
What overall picture emerges from the a nalysis of these 
special case s? Assume that A wishes to g~ft Blackacre to C 
but that pro perty is at present owned by B. The c ases have 
shoun that there are a nunber of ways in which A ca n carry 
out his purpose: 
(1) A contracts to buy 8lackacre from Band then ~akes 
a conveyance to C. It is well established that in 
such a situation the disposition is the transfer 
e xecuted by A in favour of C, and that the property 
conprised in the dispoGition is Blackacre: Lord 
Strathcona' s case . 
(2) TherP. is no contrnct but P, h '1 nds 8 the purch;:i:::,e price 
and requests B to transfer Black;:icre to C. The Courts 
in t his situ2tion have taken 3 substance approac h a nd 
hold the cisposition to be that which A directed to bo 
made of Blac~acre, and the property comprised in the 
disposition to be Blackacre : Ralli Brothers' case; 
rublic Trustees' ca se . 
( 3 ) C cont r acts to buy Blackacro from Band A pays C the 
price to d~schnrge hi::, debt to B. In thi:::; caso the 
disposition in question is the transfer of r.ioney by A 
to C, and the property compri~ed in th e disposition is 
the money : Tatham's case ; Webb's case ( per Isaacs J.). 
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(4) A gives C the ~oney to buy 81 ckacre on the condition 
that it is to be used for no other purpose . Here the 
disposition i~ the transfer of the money by A to C, 
and the property comprised in the disposition is the 
money: Potter's case . 
(5) C contracts to buy Blackacre from 8 and A pays 8 the 
price thus discharging C's liability to B. Th ere are 
two varying authorities as to the effect of this 
transaction . 
(i) the disposition is the discharge of the dobt, 
and the property comprised in the disposition 
is the extinguishr.rnnt of the debt: Re Hnll. 
(ii) thu subnt nee clpproGch is that the disposition 
i s the 'fiction l' transfer of money from A to 
C, and the property conprised in the disposition 
is the money: Overton's case . 
The propositions put forward in the above casos apply 
equally whether tha disposition ism do to C as done or to 
C as trustee for the donees. But ihile the Courts hc1ve boon 
willing ·n so~e indtonces to ta ke a substance approach to the 
qu2stion of he property comprised inn disposition it is 
s uggested that the s e decisions in no w3y challenge the general 
validity of the proposition laid down in Sn.ddon ' s case : that 
t h P property CO'ilprised in a disposition, tJhether thn disposition 
·s of cash or other prop 0 rty and whether mJdQ outriaht or throuah 
th A medium of trustees, uill be that which the donor parted with . 
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VI . RECENT DECISIO~S 
Minister of Revenue for tho Province of Ont3rio v McCreath 141 
The settler settled shares on trust whose terms were 
that the income was to be divided among the settler and her 
issue or such of them as the trustee should determine with the 
capital going to her issue as she might by Will appoint and, 
failing appointment, equally. 
Counsel for the taxpayer argued that in effect the 
settler had made two gifts, one of the equit3ble interests 
in the net income from the trust fund and the other of the 
equitable remainder in the corpus. This argum_nt was made 
because if the Court found (as in fact the Supreme Court did) 
that tho settler had retained an interest in the income portion 
of the settled property by making herself one of the possible 
objects of the discretionary trust, 142 then the entire 
settlement would be subject to duty unless it could be shown 
that the corpus of the trust fund was a sep rate gift and 
exenpt from tax by the operation of clause 5(1)(g) of th ~ 
Successions Duty Act as a disposition made more than five y ~rs 
141 
~976] ~ . T.C. 157 
1ontar10 C. A. ) : 
Canadn) . 
(Ontario H.C . ): !397~] C. T . C. 178 
Q97~ C.T.C. 178 (Supremo Cou!'t of 
142 For the New Zealand position on this difficult issue . 
See e . g ., Y. F. R. Grbich , 'Dispositions with Strings' Supra n . 14 pp . 137-42 . 
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before death and held to the exclusion of the donor . 143 
144 In the Ontario High Court Fraser J . , relying on the 
de=ision in Hall ' s case, fo und that the gift of the carpus was 
clearly severable from the gift of the incama and therefore 
it could not be said that the do. ees did not hove possession 
and enjoyment to the exclusion of the settlor . The Ontario 
" 1 Li 5 Court o f nppeal in a very short judgment agreed with the 
r3asons and conclusion of Fraser J •• 
Thi~ finding was revarsed in the Supreme Court of Canada 
D~ckson J. , delivering the d cision of the majority, said : 146 
On the wording of the t ust document I can find no reason 
to r e Q" r d t h e p r op er t y \J h i c h pa s s e d h er o a s tu o s 8 p r a t e 
and distinct dispositions, one of income and one of 
corpus. Essentially the subject-matter of the gift us 
a block of shares ••• Thus, when Mrs McCreath receivod 
incoma, the benofit came from property which she had 
purportGd fully to h~vo given away , h2r interest in the 
sh3ros ••• The subvtance of the rnt1ttcr in my view is that 
143 rn fact this argument would not hGve succe dad anyw3y in view 
of the Supreme CouLt's finding that the settlor had also re-
tnined an interest in the corpus of the gift by resPrving the 
right to designate by her will uhich of hor children should 
receive the corpus on her death and subject to what terms 
nnd conditions: 
Q 'J 76] C.T . C. 178 , 191 per Oick~on J. ; 192 per Judson J . 
For a contrary view see Y.F . R. Grbich, ' Dispositions uith 
Strings' . Supra n.14 pp . 135- 37 . 
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there was one gift, the subject-matter being 99,986 
co;;inon shares... The incor.ie fro:-n the 1948 Trust was 
part of the gift and not something 'not comprised in' 
the gift of corpus. If a father gives a parcel of 
revenue-bearin~ real estate to his son and retains 
the income or a portion of the income from the re2l 
estate , it could not seriously be contended that the 
father had jaen entirely excluded frorn the property 
disposed of. 
In reaching this decision, the learned Judge revieued 
the various cases dealing with the reservation-retention 
issue and distinguished the Hall's case approGch on the 
gr8u ~d that there was a 'mnjor structural difference' in 
the resnective Statutas under consider~tion. 147 With rc~pect, 
houever , it is suggested that the basic policy underlying 
tt e various Acts is very similar. In considerinq the Act under 
con3ideration in Re McCre3th, Dickson J. said, 'We must read 
clause 5(1)(g) and subclause 1(p)(viii) in light of the policy 
of the Act , which is to tax Gll inter vivas gifts fror.i which 
th8 donor failed to detach himself' . 148 In this resrect the 
On~~rio Act does not differ nt all from the relevant provisions 
in the New Zealand Act . 
It is unfortunate th3t the Court in Re McC~eath did not 
con~ider the broador spectrum of cnses dealing generally with 
the question of the subject-r.iatter of the gift, e:::;p0cially 
1 / ~ 
'
1
il2.i.g 108 - 89 . 
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in view of the fact that the tenor of Dicl'so n J ' s . judgment 
indicates that he based his reasoning on the view th3t the 
property car.prised in the gift was the totality of the 
interests in the asset and that retention of any inter8st 
at all by the donor will prevent him bBing entirely excluded 
from t h e gift . 149 
Nichols v I.R . c. 1 50 
This uas not a case which involved a dispositi8n to a 
trust but bath the Lower Court and the Court of Appeal 
t~ought that the reasoning which applied here would be 
equ3lly applicable in the trust situ,tion. 
The daccased who was the owner of a fee ~imple estate 
d ecided to make a gift of the estato to his son bit desir~d 
th this uife and hi~self continue to live on the estatA. 
Accordingly , the deceased transferred the estate to his son 
and the son immedic1tely eased t'1e majority of th~ estate 
back to the decensed for the terr.i of five years nnd there-
after from year to year at an agreed rental. The plan wa3 
preconceived although tho lease was in fact not executed 
until three weeks after the gift hud taken effect . 
I n the Chancery Divi~ion, Ualton J . com~ented : 151 
1 '\i .o. Goodman, ' Disoositions Under the Ontnrio Succcs3ion 
Duty Act ' (1977) 25 Can. T.J. 108 , 196. 
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rJ l)973J 3 All E. R. 632 : [197~12 ,'\ 1 r.n. 120. 
[ ~ 9 7 3J 3 A 11 E • R • 6 3 2 , 6 3 6 • 
("\ 
C, 
~ -. 
-· :s 
70. 
If I consider the ~atter in principle, it appears to 
me that if a donor D conveys property to a trustee T 
to hold on trust as to so~e interest therein f or a 
beneficiary 8 and as to the remainder of the property 
for the donor O himself, all that the donor has given 
to the beneficiary is the property shorn of the rights 
to be held in trust for D ••• The case would be 
indistinguishable from Munro v C.S.D., a decision of 
the Privy Council. 
Nau, suppose that there is no intermediate trustee, 
s o that B takes the property directly, but burdened 
with an equitable obligation to grant the lease back . 
Does this make any difference? In ~y opinion , the 
an s we r nust be in the negative. For in such a case, 
in very truth , B t2~e s the property as trustee, und 
the coincidence in id ~ntity of Band T cannot m~k~ 
any real difference to th2 legal analy~is . 
Llith respect, I do not think this is correct for the 
~eas ons put forw2rd in this paper . However , in the event 
the con~ents of Walton J. are dicta only becau~e on the 
f2cts of the case Walton J. found tha t there was no obliga-
tion legal or equitable on the son to lease b~ck and thJt 
t arefore the subject-matter of the gift was the uhole 
es t3te in fee si~ple . He concluded tha t the obligation to 
l ea s e back wns rooted only in honour or rilial piety and 
.,_ ., ~ 
'-' I - ~ consequ"'ntly the father was not ' entirely excluded ' 
f ~om the property that comprised the subject - matter of the 
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On appeal to the Court of Appeal, the Crown contended 
that even if the donee too~ the property cubject to an 
equ itable obligation to grant the lease back, for the 
purposes of estate duty the property taken under the gift 
was the fee si~ple in possession. Goff. J., delivering 
the judgment of the Court, held, contrary to Walton J., 
th t the son received the estate in fee simple at law and 
in equity but subject to an obligation binding in equity 
to grant the lease back and the property was accordingly 
brought to charge. 
After reviewing the authorities and concluding inter 
alin that th ere was no relevant di stinction ~etween 
dispositions made by th e creatio, of a trust and dis 
positions made by absolute conveyance, the learned Judge 
. d 1 52 sa1 : 
152 
• • • we think that a grant of the f ee simple , subject 
to and with the bonefit of a lease back, where such 
grant is made by a person who owns the freehold free 
from any lease, is a grant of the whole feg simple 
with something reserved out of it, n~d not a gift of 
n partia l interest leaving something in the hands of 
the grantor which he has not given . It is not like 
a revarsion or remainder expectant on a prior interest. 
It gives nn immediate right ta the rent, to~ether with 
a right to distrain for it , and, if there be a proviso 
for re-entry, a right to forfeit the lea se . Of course, 
lJ 9 7 5] 2 A 11 E • R • 1 2 0, 1 2 6 • 
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where , as in the Munro ca~e , the lcq e, or as it then 
may h3ve been, a license coupled with an in~erest, 
arises under a prior injependent transaction, no question 
can arise because Lha donor then gives all that he has, 
but where it is a condition of the gift that a lease 
back shall be created, we think thJt must , on a trua 
analysis , be a reservation of a benefit out of the 
gift and not something not given at all . 
Goff J. appears to distinguish the situation in th0 
present case uhere there was ' an immediate right to the rent ' 
from t he type of situation which arose in Hall's case where 
there was ' a reversion or remainder expect nt on a prior 
interest'. However it ~s ~uggesteci th2t the existence or 
futurity of the benefits which accrue to 2ny particular 
interest n property hns no relevance 3t nll to the issu~ 
in questio11 . Rather 1 it is suggested that the proper in u·ry 
s~ou ld be whether the interest . h.ch tho donor has purportod 
to ~eta:n was something which uas capable of beings vereci 
an retained as som~thing not given. 
Th e Court however based its decision on other grounds 
2nd did not find it necessary to re3ch 3 fin2l conclusion 
on t~e que~tion of whether the lease b2ck wns a reservation 
out of what was given . The Court found thnt the repair 
covanant contained in the lease had nJt previously existed 
;:1r,d therefore could not be sor:iething which was not given 
anrl this benefit to the donor W3G, b-nefit by contract or 
otheruicP ' referable to the gift '. The second ground was 
(' 
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an alteration to the lease to require the son to pay a 
tithe rede~ption annu i ty - this improvenont of the father ' s 
interest,according to Goff J . , could not besom thing that 
uas n0t given , but cut doun the origin3l gift . 
153 Glynn v C~S . D. (1J.S . U.) 
Th e deceased was the registered holder of over 17, 000 
ful ly paid up shares . The taxpayer contended th3t 13 , 000 
of these shares should be excluded from the dutiable estate 
of the deceased on the ground that at all nateri31 times 
the deceased h ld these shares on trust for his chilcirnn. 
The evidence show9d that there h3d be8n various tr3nsfers 
and allotments of shares to the childrnn and these were 
r8corded in the returns and accounts of the resp~ctive periods . 
At no time however had the deceased communicated th2 
existence of the trust to any of his children and neither 
had he at any time 3ccounted to any of his children for tiw 
d:vidends which he received on tha shar8s , or appropriated 
the dividends in any way which preszrvqd their sep3rate 
identity as belonging benefi~ially to each of the . It was 
common ground between the pRrties that the whole of th8 
dividends w8re received by the deceased and appropriated to 
his oun use . 
1S3 
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The judgment of Uaddell J. in the New South Wales 
Supreme Court was primarily concerned with establishing 
whether or not the deceased had intended to create a trust 
and he concluded : 154 
On the whole of the evidence in the present case there 
must , I think, be considerable doubt as to the nature 
o f an y trusts which the deceased intended to create . 
In my opinion the inference most favourable to the 
p l aintiffs which the evidence supports is that the 
deceased intended to create immediate trusts of aach 
of the paLcel of shares in question but to reserve to 
himself the right to apply thP dividends in any way 
which seemed to him appropriate, th~t is to say, he 
reserved a life inter8:::;t in the dividends on the shnros. 
_Stirnmar y 
These recent d~cjsio ns 155 show that there is a trend 
tow<:irds the approach taken in Sneddon' s case. lfo1Jever th s e 
c3s~s are unsatisfactory in :::;o far as the broader subject -
natter question has not been canvassed in the decisions . 
The Courts in both Re fkCrcath and Ji chol s case have s ened 
reluctant to come to gr ip s with the doci~ion~ in the Hall's 
case line of authority and h3ve b en content to d·stinguish 
those ca~es on their facts. 
I r: / .)•lib: d /~?/+. 
155
At the time of w~iti ng another Australian case Hutchinson v 
Conmissioner of Probate Duties (Victoria) (1977~ 7 1 . T. R. was 
in the course of publication and had not yet co~e to hand . 
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'J i:. The TRUST C01 CEPT and EQUITABLt DOCTRINES 
The trust grew out of a unique En£lish creation known 
as ' Equity ', which could conceive of someone owning property -
that is, havin~ legal title - but yet having to ad~inister it 
fa~ the benefit of others. The sui generis trust concept 
essentially divides the attributes of 01Jnership between two 
perso n s , t he rig hts of disposition and manageme nt being in 
the trustee and the right of enjoyment i n the benef~ciary . 
This separation of the beneficial interest from the 
dispositive and managerial interPsts enabled equity to treat 
the beneficial interest as an equitable estate which, like 
the legal estate, was capable of disposit·on. Equity w s nou 
a~lP, to permit successive persons to be entitled 3·multaneously 
to successive rights of enjoyment in the trust assetsr and it 
could allou a class of persons to share in the san~ right of 
enjoyment. 
The agglomeration of all these legal and equitable 
interests together make up the total ownership of the tru3t 
property . If property i3 owned absolutely the bundle of legal 
anc equitable in that property are vested in the owner. If 
thJt property is transferred absolutely to a doneP , his rights 
in it are as complete as the donor ' s WP.re . If that same property 
1~ then transferred on trust for vnrious donees , equity permits 
:.h, legnl and equitable interests to be divided bP.tween the 
t r u s tee::; 2nd the beneficiaries, but the total rights of 01.mership 
in the property re~ain the same . 
76. 
Even without the machinery of the trust, it is possible 
to assign particul3r equitable interests in property. In 
New Zealand , for example, it has been accepted that it is 
pos~ible to alienate income through an assignment of the right 
thereto without assigning the source of that income. 156 Where 
the right to income has been validly assigned the income 
will attach to that right when it occurs . However the income 
does not arise because of the existence of that right, it 
arises out of something entirely separate - namely, the corpus 
of the property itself. The point is that while tho right 
itself may determine who has the ownership of the income when 
it does arise, it has nothing to do uith tho 'production' of 
thJt income. Therefore , it is suggested, the right to income 
cannot exist as an effective interest entiroly separ3te, and 
with no connections uith , the corpus of the property which 
contains the source of that right. 
A similar argument can be made with respect to the equitable 
interests arising under a trust. There is support for this 
conclusion in the various arguments which have been put forward 
on the as yet unresolv2d question of the juristic nature of 
157 the cestui gue trust. Whether the beneficiary has rights 
156 
Arcus v C. I . R. 096~ N.Z.L.R . 324 : Spratt v C.I.R . Q96~ 
N. Z. L.R . 272 . McKay v C.I.R. Q97~ N. Z. l . R. 592. 
157 see e . g . D. M. Waters , 'The Nature of the Trust Beneficiary's 
Interest ' ( 1967) 45 Can . Bar Rev. 219. 
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in reD or rights in personam or even whether this is a 
relevant dichotomy is not of great import for tho purposes 
of th·s paper. Llhat is significant is th~t whatever rights 
the beneficiary may have are directly connected to eith r 
the trustees as legal owners of the trust property or to the 
trust property itself . 
For the greater part, the beneficiary asserts his right 
through the personal remedy which he has against the tructee 
to perform his duties of proper control and administration of 
the trust fund. From the remedial angle therefore, the 
beneficiary only has person 1, obligatory rights. From tho 
substantive angle however, tho trust bon8fici3ry's re~ed·a1 
right exists because the beneficiary has a material interest 
in the trust property. 
For these reasons, it seems incredib e that the donor is 
able to say, as The Hall's casP opproach sugg~sts, that he has 
retained a particular interest from the corpus of the property 
as something not givon. Th8 equitable inter st is ·nextri, bly 
connected to the corpus of the property transferred, and the 
donor's ability to enjoy the intere~t which ha has depends 
entirely on the equitable doctrines operating throuQh the 
trust concept . Rather , if the donor wants to retain a benefit 
to himself out of the property which is to be settl8d on tru~t 
hn necessarily has to resorve that interest out of the property 
as a beneficiary under the trust . 
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The Resulting Trust 
Th e appr oach taken in this paper is not without problems 
particularly as regards the resulting t~ust . The Courts have 
b8en willing to imply a resulting trust in situations where, 
for example, an express trust has failed or where there has 
been a failure to exhaust the beneficial interest. It is 
therefore a rguabl e on the proposition put forward in this paper 
that the Courts could always bring back into the dutiable 
estate of the settlor all trust settlements , whether or not 
he had re served to himself an express benefit, on the ground 
tt at there was always the po3sibility that the exprss~ trust 
might fail or that the beneficial interests might not be 
exh~usted and a resulting trust would arise. This obviounly 
would be a ludicrous result and contrary to the intention of 
the lngisl2ture. 
Thi s problem was considered by Ostler J. in In re A~ams , 
158 Ada~s v C.S.D.. There the settlor h2d settlerl property on 
V3rious trusts for his son and his son ' s Liife nd children . 
There was also an express provisiGn that if the son should die 
in the settlor 's lifetime, then the corpus should return to him. 
Th e learned Judge argued that where the objects of a 
~ettlement become exhausted or fail there is alw2ys in law an 
imp li ed resulting trust of the corpus of the fund to the 
sett ler and h e found that the settler in this case had done no 
1 5Fl 
N.Z.L.R. 74 1. 
79. 
more than to provide expressly for a right which the law 
gave to him in any case. He recognised that if he held 
othorwise then every settlement would be cauQht by the 
equivalent of section 12(1)(1): 159 
This uas not the intention of the legislature: on 
the contrary , the legislature plainly intended to 
exclude property comprised in settlements from the 
dutiable estate of the settlor , except in cases where 
t he settler reserved a life interest to himself or an 
interest for a period determined by hi death or the 
death of some other person. 
There does not appear to be a logical solution to this 
dilemma. The solution might bn, as Ostler J. suggests, to 
2xr ude entirely resulting trusts from th8 operation of the 
no ional estate provisions, but this too has its drawb ck3. 
It would always be open to the settlor in this situation to 
manipulate the terms of the trust settle0ent so th the w s 
virtually assured of benefiting from a resulting trust within 
a foreseeable period of time . Perhaps the only satisfactory 
ansuer is for the Courts to take R subst2ncc appro8lh to e3ch 
car,e and to ask whether the trust is such that it can be said 
th~t the settlor did his utmost to ensure that the property 
d"d not revert to him, or whether it coulrl reason bly be 
for seen that some interest would ultimately rovert to the 
settlor . 
3 • 
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It is sugges~ed that these difficulties arise becouse 
of conflicting policies of trust law on the one hand 8nd 
the notion3l estate provisions on the other . The dev .lopment 
of the equitable concept of trust in this area has been based 
on the assumption t hat where a settler transfers prop8rty to 
trustees on tr ust he should dispose of the property complet8ly 
and it s houl d no t revert to him at all . As Harman J . said in 
Re Gi llinqhan Bus Disaster Fund160 on the question of resulting 
trusts: 
This doctrine does not, in my judgment, rest on any 
evidence of the state of mind of the settler , for in 
the vast najority of cases no doubt he does not eYpect 
to see his noney back: he has created n tru3t which 
so far as he can see will absorb the whole of it. The 
resulting trust arises whore that expectation is for 
some unforeseen reason cheated of fruition, and is an 
i n ference of law based on after knowledge of the P.V8nt. 
Equity has therefore developed means by uhich the settler 
can avoid any possibility of having the sP.ttled property brought 
back into his estate. The most obviou~ w~y of course is for 
th e settler to make a gift over to a charity. 161 It is 
therefore possible for the settler to cnsur~ th~t pro~ rty 
sett l ed on trust will not revert to him because as f ar as trust 
160 
1 6 1 
8 9 5 ~ 1 A 11 E • R • 3 7 ( emphasis added) . 
See e . g . Nathan and Marshall, A Casebook on Trusts 
( 5t h ed . 1967 ) p . 150 : Charitable Trusts Act 1957 . 
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lau is concern9d the question of an implied resulting trust 
only arises where the express trust has a~tunlly failed or 
where the beneficial interests have actuJlly been exhausted. 
The notional estate provisions on the other hand operat,, 
on the basis that the donor , while purporting to dispose of 
property inter vivas , has reserved to himself an interest in 
that propert y. The Courts in such cases arA therefore concerned 
with the question whether the do~or has reserved any interest 
out of uhat was given . According to the i~plied resulting 
trust that interest which arises if the express trust fails 
or if the beneficial interests are exhausted is reserved to 
th8 settlor. Therafo_e strictly spc2king the settlemen~ should 
be caught by the notional ostate provisions. Obviou·,ly this 
interpretation is not appropriate in the~e casas. 
This, in fact, raises the wider issue of whether the 
operatio~ of equitable doctrines shou d affect tho oparation 
of statutes which have nothing to do with the working m chin~ry 
of tru3ts but are concerned with determining the n·1ture of 
certain interests for other purposes - for example, the claims 
of the revBnue nuthorities. 
The 2ttitude of the Americnn Courts to this problem is 
162 expressed by f'1r Justice Frankfurter in Helvering v Hr1llocl': 
The l3w of conting8nt and vested ren8indors is full of 
casuistries .• • The implication of these distinctions nnd 
controversies from the lau of pro~Prty into the administratior 
of the estate tax , precludes a fair and workable tax system . 
1C?(1940) 309 U. S . 106, 116. 
See also J . R. Shift, ' Death Taxes and the Inter Vivas Truct' . 
( 1966) 14 Can . T. J. 190 , 191 . 
82. 
Essentially the same interests, judg8d from the point 
of view of wealth , will be taxable or not , de~ending 
on subtle casuistries , which may have their historic 
justification but possess no ralev3nce for tax purposes. 
These unw i tty diversities of the law of property derive 
f rom medieval concepts as to the necessity of a 
continuous seisin . Distinctions uhich origin ted und r 
a f eudal eco nomy when land dominated social relations 
are peculiarly irrelevant in the application of tax 
measures now so largely directed towards intangible 
wealth . 
A t t h ' d 163 't th t th s one comme n a or as sai, i appcarc a e 
radical reforms envisaged by the American position will not 
be ,cceptable in New Zealand in the near future, nnd it is 
outside the scope of this paper to examine the question further . 
However it does appear on the face of it thnt the effect of 
the proposition put forward in this paper would follow fairly 
closely the effect that an adoption of the Ame~ic3n position 
would have. 
163 v. F. R. Grbich , 'Dispositions with Strings' s11prn n.14 p.93. 
83. 
VTII. CO JCLUSI01J 
The contention made in this paper has been that where 
the donor has purported to retain an interes~ in property 
which he has settled on trust, he necessarily reserves th3t 
interest out of the subject-matter comprised in the gift and 
that sections 11 and 12 therefor, operate to bring the whole 
gift back into the dutiable estate. 
In conclusion therefore how is the scttlor to avoid the 
provisions in section 11 and section 12? It is suggested 
that the ansue~ subject to other issues being resolvGd,
164 
is to be found in another American c se , Comn~ssion°r of 
Internal RevenuR v Estate of Church
165 where Mr Jus ice 
Black said : 16
6 
••• an estate tax cannot be avoided by any trust tran~fer 
except by a bona fide transfer in which the settlor, 
absolutely , unequivocally, irrevocably and without possible 
reservations, parts with all of his title and Lll of hir 
possession and all of his Pnjoyment of the tr2n0ferr 0 d 
property. 
16aror example, wh8ther th e settlor as a bnn8ficiary under 
a discretionary tru st ha s a reserved interest and whether 
the settlor as a trustee has a reserved interest : 
supra n.142 : n.14 3. 
165 (1948) 335 U.S. 632 . 
1
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11. Gi£c '.\ ith rcscn.'.ltioa-( 1 ) ubject to this ~cction, the 
dt tiahlc ·st:1c.: sh,·,Jl include .'.lny property rornrri~ ·cl in :my 
gift, v,:l ther .'.l cl~t~i:tblc gift or not, m:1cL by th·· clccl'..~Sl'd at 
:my ti me, ,vh-::th.:r before or :ifter the coml ncern nt of dti 
A ct, unlcs corn ficlc pos~ession .'.lnd cnjCJ)'ff'.cnt h:1s hlcn 
m sumccl b)" the c!on:..c-
( a ) I mmediately on lhc making of the gift or not \c:,s han 
th ree yec.1rs before the cle:1th uf t.hc ckc~:l',cd; ;incl 
(b) In eid·cr C'.'> , h~s beLn thenceforth rctaii~crl t > the 
entire exclusion of the clccc:1sccl or of :my b· ndit 
to him by contr:ict or otJ1crwi:c. 
(2) \ Vlict·e propc t ty coinrri);c·cl in such a gift w:1.· :111 inLnc•;t 
in Janel or ir t ck,tcds, r ctuttion or as urnp~ion by the d.:c ·~(S"'l 
o[ ac tu:il occupaLion of t he bud or actual enjoyment of ;'.n 
incorporeal r i;ht O\'t:r the Janel or :tctu,d ossc<;:;io 1 of the 
cha ttels sli all be cl isreg:irclcd i[ for full considcr:1ti0n in 1noncy 
or m oney's worth paid udorc or O\-..im:- at the tbt<.: of death 
of th e clccc:iscc! . 
Cf. 1955,~o.105,s.5 (1 ) (r), (L,); 19Go,·. 10.<'3,s.10 
12. SctLkmcu t or other dispns iti ·rn rn,tdc by cll'cca.,,cc1-
( 1) Suhjc·ct to ;:his s· cti,)n :rncl to s,·n;on J ~ of thi A, t, tl1 · 
d ut iable c.; ate s!ull ir clwk any property cc,,npri.:;,·d i!1 :.1.;1y 
scttlc1nc11t, ULl')t, or other disp<,.,iliJrL uf prnp"rty 111.t k. I y the 
clcccasccl, whether before or :1ftn lu: (·m11111,.;11cc1w nt of tlii · 
Act,-
( a) Hy \':.1:ch :u1 int1·1 c. tin that p1 CJpc; tr, 0?· in the p.oc·'cd,; 
uf the ::-:ilc tlicrc-of, is 1-c:,;c I v,;d cir l1cr ex JJ l J,: or h · 
imp ication to thc clcccJ,1·d ror Iii) life or lor 't1 c Ii!~ 
of any c,ther pcr~un, or for :Lrt)' pt'riocl d, 1,·:·mi11cd 
by rdcrcnrc co Litt: dc:tth of Ll 1c clt-cc.1 cd oc of any 
thcr pcr.,on; or 
(u) \ Vhich is accnrnp:tninl l>r tltc; l l'S ·n·:tl ion Ut a '1rc.r1Ct' 
0f or ~ u,11tr:1Lt for, a iv ih·n,·fi to the eke ·:1.,ccl [01· 
) , 
th tc1rn of hi life or of tl1·· lifi- of any c h1;r pc:rson, 
or fo1· ~in) p,:1i,;cl c.!.·tc11ni11cd by rdc1cr1cc to tl:t: 
clc~tth of tit-:: c.L cT.;cd or of :tny o her p··t· nn; or 
( c ) 13)' \,·liich the c! 'r ,1\c·cl Ii h re , n· ·ci to lti ,1 cil ilr: 1 igit , 
by tb; cx,·rci-; · of a1ty J)Ll\ ·< t, to rc·turc ui lii·t1 ·elf 
or to rc~cbirn th:i.t 111 op ·rty or he pm,·c<'d · of tht: 
sak thcrr-o ·; --
u nlcrss tkH intcl t~St. l)l't1cfit, Ot 1 iglit ( tr><~1'lh,'r \\·j It :tllf in CT-
cc,r hcnt'fit or ri,.,.h \\ hctl1,·1 c, tlw s,111w or n! .!t1\' dtfft:n nt 
k it;cl, \\ h ic-i'1 Ill.ty.:-·h,t\•c• bt.: '[I :-.t1li tilttlt cl tit{ rcfor) 1i·:1r;, by any 
r c.:lcasc, sttr rc1~clcr, merger, ccs:,cr, f,1: f,·itur"<·, clctc·1 mi11:1ti m, 
a li,·n~iti()rt, cc cLt;r,o·iti 11, \\'holly r.c:t cc.I tu t:·i or to lJ · \·c cc~l 
in t lic clt: cac;cd :1t all· cirnc: rn()t\.'. tkut tl1tcc yc:~rs Ldorc Inc; 
clc:1th, wlietha bdorc, or :if tc·r tlw co11t111cnn rll(;rll of tl:i, r\ct. 
(2) TJi,, r,rO:) rt·· cu 11111 i ,·cl in ;:nv such s ·ttlt:rncnc, tr ui;;t, 
I • J I • ' l I or other di,r, 1,iti,,n c,f ptr,l' ·11,: '.,hall lw dl'l:1ncd Lo 111c1w c.; l ~c.; 
p roc,· ·cl· of it., s::k cir L 111\'<'tStCHI, :1ml :ill mvc.s~ 111 11 s f:1t l c 
t ime bcin:~ rcp:-r t'!l in.~ ir, :111d all prnpcrty_ \ 1:·lt1 .... h ha, m :u:_: 
n n11r11-r IH!Cn s•:l;o;ri'. .·,·d f(Jr t H' ptOi :Ly t1n:;1wdly cc r'.1p:1 eel 
i 1 tli:tt !:i'.::dca.• ·m, ,u ·, ~1r o I, r tli po i·icm of J):'( p1.:rl/. 
Cf. 19:i.:i; :; . lO'i,s. ~, (1) (j), (:i) (:1),
0
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( i i) 
Scc~ion 2(L ) (c ) Finan. Act 189~ J..:~n~ property p~ssinJ on Lh e 
c.-:,· .. 1 of the decc::isec.l t o incluc.e pro?2rty \·:hich ,.aulcl b ~ TC'[L1ir..:J on the 
·~~tb of th- dec~ased t o ,e included in m acco~nt under s~ction 38 
..;·: ·t.,;:-1..; and Inland Revenu,-> Act 1831, cJ. • ,ne.nclecl by sec:::i.on 11 Cu~;toms ::in<l 
_,d1.,1J Rcv-=n u e At 1 389 with cercain delct.ions . Th0 r lcv·nt provisions 
,. s 2.;-.-~.ickd and a 1 tc-cc J a re set out ,.;i th tlHVi(' an~n:.l.nt:!nts . 
S •ct.i.on 33(2): 
'Ii!e [ real or ] perso11ctl or r.1ove.:1b1c ;>rup"'rty to be ir,c1udt.!d 
in ~n accoun t shal l b~ pro;,erty of th(' follouing descri.pliorLs, viz:-
( a) Any property . . . t2k.cn unch•r: a dispo•_;_ition, r.,ac.lt• by any person 
so dyin0 , purportiP-5 to ot12.rat:e as an imr.: diatc gift inter vivu 
wh ether by way of tr.::!.nsfer , cl,·live.ry, dr:clar.J.Lion o[ trust 
o r olhcn.;ise , ,:hic:1 sh.::!.ll not· hav,! b··en l>ona [id~ na<l..: [ t~,:~l v e:) 
monlhs bp[orc the de.ath of ti,.· c1eci!asecl [an<l :;haLL :includ. 
property t.::i.ken l:r.<l~c a girt ,,',h<.'.ncv~r madt', at \/hich p, or ·rty 
bona fidP po.·:,,•ssicn ,:rn<l cnjoyrn•!nt sh3ll not h~lv b 'L'tt :::issum~<l 
by the do[lee ir::12cl i.2.tely UiJOn Lhe ;•,i (t and Lhcw.:cfortil r !tain ~d, 
t G the t·[lti.cc cxclu.,;~on o[ ti:t-.! d~mur u, of ~rny h,·n·[it to him 
by co:t· 1·:t<..t oc ot:1:>c.1i:,e . ] 
(c) Any prowcr: y p ,1:-:'.;i.,1:; nnd,r ~ny p.1~:t: or futurL! .;ettll'l't·!Hl [tH· any 
t ru.:L x./nv l her c::p.:- •.-;s<·cl in • ..rr.i.i.i.ng or uthvrui..;,, . . . , :-:n<l to thP 
p roceed ·, (l [ '.;,t l,• th:c"rcof] 1:1.1de by .iny pt:,·~:nn dy LI·~ on or a[tc ·r 
SllCli thy liy dl:~d en:: ;tny ot.,1p:· i.,1.,tru~.1 .:nt noL tak.i,1~; ,!f'[,.::ct :is a 
wil l , \,hc:rcby an it1. erest iu s tch proµ.-rty lL>r t.h,.! pro ·E!:.; of 
s a L c UH· re! o f:) t. o r l i. t e or f e> r .:1 n / p, · r· i. o l cl , • t c r..-i i 11 a b l · b y 
rct'l,' llCP to cl0 tt'.1 is H'S E·rv~·d citlwr C' ·pr' ·ly or by implication 
l o !..~tl:' i,,,ttlor, or ,.;heccb/ t.itc ;,~! Llur m,t; h 1 .Jl rc~;erv:>d t 
h i 10 Se l [ t. h C ( i b h t I>~/ t h t' l' ·~ ,; r ': . - t! ll f any I' U '.·It! C t O r 'S t Or C 
t o !ti.rns~·l[, or LO ri:!,:l.ti.m th· :tlisn1·1tc intecL-;t i_n :;11ch pror·rty 
~[ or- Lh~· pea<... ·~d3 c,[ -n 1~ th"·:::-eufJ . 
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S<.;;c.:ti_cn 102 St.1n1 DL!.'.::.t.e:, hCi... 1920-5':> 2.- :1nc:utkd by ~,c Liun 2(o)(i.i) 
Fo:c t:l<.'. pur. os.,.:; oc th~ n.s··~3:;--i2.1'.:. anJ p,t 1 . en:.. o,= cl~.:i.t:h <luty but 
r;;..:bjc.ct as h;_r2in::i.Ct2r provided. t::-tc! r,:;t.:.1te o[ a d(·Ct:2.sccl p,•rs.-;a 
shall be clecn2d to include and consisL of the follovin~ c
1
.:i.· .~s 
oE pro()2rty : -
(2) (c) i,ny pn.,?erty pa.:;sing unJ.::!r .-:iny ~ctt le, tent, trust, or o her 
dis~o.3itinn o[ property n3. l2 b:;' the cl2.c,~ased ,.:h,:;th~r bc<o.r..; or a[ter 
th2 passing of tlliS Act -
( i) by which o.n interest in or b!::nc.f:i.t out of or conne.:: t.!<l ,Ji h 
t hat prop~rty, or in th2 ?roceed~ of the s~le thercuL, is 
reserved eit;.cr c.,prcs.;ly or by i2plic.::i.tion to the c1cc-e.'.1SC!d 
for his life o.c for the life oi: any other t,er:~on., or [or 2..,1.y 
pcrio<l deternin2cl by r2.E2renc:2 Lo the dco.th of th"" c.<-·c,:.isecl 
or oE .::i.ny other person; or 
( ii) which is accom:-'~.1iz- bJ tb; r::"<•rv.'.'tion or a . sur:i.nce oE, or a 
contract Ear, any benefit to th•..:. d.c;cca.e.cl for the teen of hi.s 
li [e or o[ thc. life of an)' othec p._,rson, Ot' for any peri.o<l 
dd.crmine<l by r'--f.::-rencc to th2 <l~.:i.t:h of the; dee •a ed o:- of any 
utlte-r per ..,on; or 
( iii)by ,-klich t:12 d,._ceased h::i.s reserved to h i.mself the right, by the 
e>:crcise. o[ :i.ny pm,'er, to r2:;tor~ to himsc.'.i[ or to r·.: l:ti..La that 
prO[)~!-rt:y or th~. ?t'OLC<.:ci. :· of i1~ s.:ile thereo( . 
i-iher<', i.n respt~cr of. ar:y prC?-c-:ty pas .·in~, under any ::;,•L._
1
e:.~n , trust 
or ot i, ·r <lispo,:; i.t iJm r:1ad~ by t:h, d 0 ccasc.:J • ..1h,:th ir lw .or· or aft.er 
the pa';~; ·i.ng c,r: ti>L~; t'ct, th.::r~ ,.-,a.., in e:zii'.tenct- at .1.ny t:.:..., ! ( ·i.Lh~t· 
hcf"l•' or a[t ·:::- tit' C(.~:;[c"/..':::J:.ict of chr• ~;c.1.r·1p Dutic..::. (A:1.·nd.7'1•.:l'C) 
Act ]'!'i'J) \.Jil.hi.n i..ll2. Lhn:·2 y.,ar s uef..1,~ the d,··l'.h o[ t\w d c·;•:,cd 
any ~.udi intc-r'-::;t., b£>ne[it, rc;.c•rv~ti.011., ;1.;:~u1·:1nce, cu1 t r,1c:t ur 
ri.ghL as js rc[crcctl t in th2 [ure;~oi..,1·~ provi_si.on., or t:,is sul,-
para.~raph, tltc: ~·ttl~ment, t!.u3t c.>l' o twr cli~,?o.;·ti.m1 ~;\1,tll, not-
wi. th.;t.an<l.i.nr; that :::-.uch int•.!t'::~S t, b,...ne tit, rcr.erv,1.t ion, ;:1s.;u r. nee, 
contr;1 ·t ur rig)it bad cPa,ed to c·:<i:;L befor~ tit,~ cl,•·tth of. tlte 
clecPa'-ie<l, be rc.:1<l and con.str-·t2<l for th~ purposv<· o[ his sub-raragr.'.lph 
as j f s11ch int,·rco,;t, b2.ne.:"it, .:c: · rvat.i.on, :i.~, ... ur~nc..:, contr:u.:t o-r 
right htcl conti..nu~cl i.n c:-~i..,tcnce until the. ,le· tlh of the dcc..:as~:<l . 
2(cl) Any JJ.COperty cu'Ttpri..;~d i,1 ~ny ?,i.1·t rnacle by lt · c
1
,·cca. 0,l .:J.t 
o.ri:.; ti~e, \-1hPthcr l>c!fore or <1fter th2 pa•;sin~ ,)f: tlti:-, Act, t
1
f Hhi.c11 
bona fi<lc possossion and (',tj()y-::'TlL 1i·1; 110 t,~c.:tt a:,:-;11;•1t·Ll 1y ~~l<.: dc-:-:.~e. 
immeJ iat .ly upon. the ~ i. f'":. an. l tb .:rV>~ lt1rtl1 1c· ·a i 11:·tl lt) th<.! l.!llt i.rc 
c~:clu•;i.on of Lh' d..:c.:!aS,.!cl, ot· o( anlf l1,'n,·[i.t. to him of \.~t3L',n!Vt::l-
kinrl or in n.ny \.Jty uhatsuc!'-' r d1..:th -r t·nf'nrc<-•;ible at.: law or i.n 
er[ u i.Ly or not :,rnl ~JTH'never- t.l1-. Ll..:c- ·:1!; 'tl tlj c·<l. 
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S~1...c'..iOi l8( 1) Succt!~, ... i.on Uut.:.e.; Ac..L F 1HLitc'.1· t\7:12nclr •nt :'cL 1919 
D~ty sh.'.111 b · chac~,~.:2ul12 ... upon Lltc net pre.·,·nt v:\l,i.; o[ :iuy 
~=-~;L,rty i.spos <l of by c_rtc.in .for::t.3 of clispo it ion, in LtJin~; 
;i..£:t, ilTl82<li.atc:..y upCJn such c.lisp,bition, and i.i:rc~p cti1t: of t:hE: 
ti:-:~ of the death of the p~rSOil .--1.c1.1.zin6 the snr:1._:, if tr1 • p.:.:rson 
~~ki-0.3 uru.lcr such di~po::;it ion do,·· not itr:meJi.:i.te ly upon tltc 
c'.is;)Ositi n bona £ i.<l. assun-! the bene fi.cial i.ntcre"l: .:in<l pu..;'.,ession 
of. such pro;H,:rty and thence::. [on,;ard rcUt ~n such inl: ~r .. ·st c1n,l 
~00st:ssion to the entire c:-:clu.;i.on of th2 per·on r,takin:~ suc:\1 
C.:i.cµosi.tion, 2nJ without r''Serv.1.tiun to such pPrson· of any 
ber..E:fit from or interest i.n such prop rty by contr.:2ct: ur ollten,isc . 
: ::i:n 3(1) Estate Ti~ Ac:t, S . C. 1958 
'l'iu:,r, slt.:111 be includ.::<l in CGf'ltH! iny, Lhc .:t'· 1~rci1c;aLc: n-2t: valu' . •. 
(d) propPrty di.sro- J of by rhc <l~cen~eJ under n <lisp ;ition 
•.:;1e,,;•v<:.:r rnnde, of 1,:h i.ch :lctu;:i 1 ;:tnd liun,L CiJ,, poi;:;t,st. ion :,t1ll 
c:1 joy,·, ·nt Has nut·, at lc.:1., t th r2'' :.,·(·,1 rs prior r o lh · Llc,tl: ol 
t!1t' dcce:i.secl, 
(i) i!,;Sur.,•tl by lt..: \'ccr:;c,n to '.,]10,n t\1,· di•:pd.;i.t.i.o:t \'1_, .·td,· OC Ji:,, 
.:t tru,:tcc or .:t~~t.:, t fu1· thnt Pl'l .-<.1tt, ;11ul 
(ii.) therc::tfl:l't 1•·t·,ti.r..;d tu Lll' Pitt i.~c' ,·~c u~:ion c, t l' ei" ··1.; ·tl 
,•nc.l Lo LltP cnL.i.n" t,:clu~;i••t1 of :111:.,· lil'tt,'lit Lo iti,1, \:r1•tii.·1· b:,• 
c onlr:ir.t or o tlt c!i.:'." l!,\\, 
(:--) pror .. rty cc 1 1pri.1,f~cl ia .:is"' tlcnwnt \,11 ·n vPt 1:i• l.•, 1;lll't·h,·r l>y 
<lel!tl or any oth~r i1t•;ttu-:1t•nt uot t;1kiE/~ ,i[f.•rt ,1,; a wi 11, 
1:herrby an i.nt l'CC"t ja su-ti prnp,,rt"y f:or 1.i[L· o~· :::1,1:, otltt'I'.' 
period c.11..:r •1.mi.n~blr.: by rc.L('n·nct> 10 ck:-ti:lt ii; re~;,-rved f'·i. ·ltt~r 
·::prcs.dy or by irnplic,,ti,,n t:1 t.:h · d ··e.:i::.wd ,is s1•t.:tlor c,r dt r(' y 
tltc deceas,.,rl h;1:; r~:; ,n".:d to lii.m:;,,lf the r i.t~hc, by r.h · cxel'.'ci~.2. 
of .::tny p<11,·::>r, to rc!Gtor-e LO hi,'l ,~If or to r,•c :1i-i the nhsolute 
j 11 t e CC S t i O ~; l C h p t' p ? r t :'/ ; 
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,.... 1 \ ... l y ·j" . , 1 ..,-rer-:; 'lc;rdor ... :. >r ·,;,1o~e bPn°r it ,. 'i i-)rop1..: 
') re..::: s e ,:; 0 :.l -: ': e ,1 e?. ~ '1 0 :: ', n e d e C ea s t; c1 i 0 Li.'l D 1 
(p) ( ·1iii) : 
2.--::..·:; p.ro:1e:-ty pas::-;in · un(ler any n< f,C o .fn:n.,,..c 3ettle··1er.t, 
i·_cl-.;.lin; c.:l.Y tru2t , \1heshcr expre ·s,_ l in 1 ,ri:.,inr~ or 
o-_;1er·,·:ise and if con ... ii'1e in a rleed nr o-;:;1 er iHst::' :mP.at 
e: : e c -;:; in c .:; he s e -:; t l en c n T, , /11 e t ll er : , lU' L d e e c. o r o t 1 er 
i:'lst~ 1rr.e1n; 1:::1.s mane for valuabl~ cons..:.clera ~.io:n or no , 
2.s he-::1,,·een ~ 1e set tlor 2.nd cmy o th 'l' pPrr-;on , •yt,le by 
r,:::ed or o·:11.er instru'11ent no c t·1.:ir.s e;'[~c-;:, r1.s a 'd.i.11 , 
·.-;·_--::r~:1y c.::1 in .... f'::re.::31:, in such ;1ropPru] () ' tr.' Pl\JCPe(L: of 
S'tle ther~o.f for li.i.'c: , or any or,her periorl r!.eter.r1.i.nrtLl.::? 
½:,· re::erP~':C9 ~o death , is ...;<2· ved ';i t;"lf~t· e:prP,5sly or 
b:r i,:-ilicrtiOL -:;o the '"'f"Ctlol' , Or' '·.'11Pt·' y v}e 'ettlol' 
l"':J.:" :,R.ve ..-:-esPr ·e<! t:o hi·nsel.t' t:1e ri ii r J? :. ~ exercl~,i: 
o .: 2. :. j,- ~Jo • : 8 r -: o r e s :, o r ... to h i ·n ., P l 1 , 1 v, ·,, , 1.· ,.., • l · i "1 t 1 :: 
2.000 1. 1-,e ;~ --:;P ..,~,1. i.'1. ,3uch ')ro:.1 ,, •,l· ,~·1, .,roc~P.:::;~; o~.' 
s;._-::_-;. -i r:~·'I:' , o-· ~o O t,ner•.,ise l.' ,. vll' c;he ,,"'"!}~ r anv 
r)~l.: t -,1-1 .. ;rco..=- .•.• 
, . ., -·1~0:; ('1\;(r-\ 
\.,, 0,.-- ./ \ r)/ 
5 . ( ·) o dutl shall bt) lcvi ~d on ~n . .; of tl.e r.'ollo·.·.i11!: 
·)r1..1 H~~· ,/ , .• or or. any pe.,,..~,O'l to 1 nw, L'.ere ·1r0 any t_c~,. .... 1s:1L~~-·ion8 
o: ,·1y of thE: :·0110.,,irit ')I:op"'r',y , ,,. i ,h rcf,:1ect to sue 
t.r.:1S'"'1::::~;_(H;S , r .. or 0'1 "V pt> ~;on O ··ho·1 ~r of tL•· t:>l:o•,j>u 
,--i_i_rnio i-Lo;1r, 2.r=: ··ri,-.,ls, :i.,1t ..,.,e~;r.iec:; ~.o SlL:'l c:isposl-:io'1..., , ·t ct 
s·;ch l).CO!JSrty and clisl)o,;i ~-ions shall no:., be i:ncltid":!c~ i.1 t't':! 
2.. --t-~:!:·ef~ci':e value nor inclufled for t'.18 i-J'JL'~ ose 01 de 1,ermi 1lnb 
R;J ra,e of duty , 
(f_;) -:;_r1y di_sryosi1;ion \':1er. c ... ,l,ual 2nd l!1), · n,joy·ri •1-: 
,)_nci Jo.-.;se.:;sior: of '" propP.r· ,:· , i"'1 r-·.,pec hici1 .. 11e 
di'~_)):"'i·,ior. is r'12(' , '.:as ;:s,-,,10 11 1orp •,\· ~·iv•• ~-e, ~ 
r,~fo~·1; "':.•lP ' . .'.':. "'.:c o -· r; l. ~h o t' .,1 dee ''!..,P. l f ~hF- per· 0 
~o ·::.o'"'l :;h, clispo::;i U 0:-1 i~ "lad,~ , or by r .s t~t.. ~·or 
,;11c•. pe:.'.:''.:iO. , ancl Li P.HCPfO!'',''H'ri re cli ted :,o ..,rle e n;j_~p 
exc2.:.i.sion of c;}:P '1PCec-c-,;t:> or of :-i11y 101"' ... L1, to "hl·11 •,,;!i:::,he.r. 
vol ·~-: -;,,ry or V con i::;r:ic . or o .,h" •,:.i.. r ; 
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